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The boundary between charity and business has become a moving target.
Social enterprises, philanthropy divisions of for-profit companies (most notably
at Google), and legislation creating hybrid nonprofit/for-profit forms all use
business models and practices to mold and pursue charitable objectives. This
Article asserts that charity law must be streamlined in order to respond to these
and other dramatic charitable innovations. My new vision of charity law cen-
ters around two essential requirements. First, charity law must continue to
demand that charities maintain an other-regarding orientation, pursuing bene-
fits for someone other than their own leaders and managers. Second, existing
charity law must be revised and supplemented to mandate that charities utilize
group governance. Additionally, this dual focus should be intensified by
removing the limits on commercial and political activity that currently clutter
charity law. These reforms will enhance charity law's ability to regulate tradi-
tional charities. Moreover, focusing charity law on its essentials will reveal the
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tools necessary to respond to the exciting developments blurring the boundary
between charity and business.
INTRODUCTION
The boundary between charity and business has become a mov-
ing target. Google located its philanthropic efforts within its for-profit
company, rather than in a traditional nonprofit foundation. Social
entrepreneurs are forming for-profit companies to pursue environ-
mental, educational, and public health objectives. Jurisdictions are
creating hybrid forms of organization, which blend elements of a
charity and those of a business enterprise. Scions of business speak of
the need to incorporate social goals and responsibility into their mod-
els, in order to generate sustainable success. Yet, the serious short-
comings of current charity law thwart its ability to respond to these
dramatic innovations. Legislators, regulators, and courts can enable
charity law to do so by identifying and focusing on its essentials.
So, what are charity law's essentials? First, one must unpack the
concept of "charity." To be a charity, an organization must pursue a
charitable mission as its dominant and overriding purpose. Notably,
such charitable missions go well beyond almsgiving. They embrace a
broad array of missions, each pursuing some vision of the good, and
include entities as diverse as the American Red Cross, your local com-
munity theater, and most U.S. law schools. The ways an individual
charity achieves its charitable mission can and should evolve in
response to changing times and circumstances. Still, the mission
imperative remains the touchstone of what is a charity.
The problem with the mission touchstone, however, is enforce-
ment. Accountability to mission is exceedingly difficult to measure
and police. Perhaps some donors or patrons may be willing to moni-
tor mission and withhold their support and patronage as a sanction,
but these efforts will be limited and insufficient. Public enforcement
threatens undesirable government influence on the content of chari-
ties' missions. Moreover, public enforcement of mission undermines
charities' autonomy, the characteristic that enables them to be innova-
tors, to take countermajoritarian positions, to serve the underserved. 1
Ultimately, charities must be trusted to police mission themselves.
1 See, e.g., ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-17 (J.P. Mayer
ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835); Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflec-
tions on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELLJ.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 555, 572 (1998); David Horton Smith, The Impact of the Volunteer Sector on
Society, in THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 347, 347-55 (David L. Gies et al. eds., 1990);
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The "Independent" Sector: Fee-for-Service Charity and the Limits of
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A key goal of charity law is thus to assist charity leaders and stake-
holders in enforcing mission. Until now, discussions of charity law
have argued the essential way that charity law does this is through the
nondistribution constraint. A charity must reinvest its residual earn-
ings in its mission to serve others, rather than route those earnings to
individuals who possess organizational control.2 Current charity law
embodies this rule and the slightly more general idea that charities
must use their assets to benefit some charitable class. This require-
ment that charities maintain an other-regarding orientation focuses
charities on mission by declaring self-regarding behavior unaccept-
able. This basic command to serve others is, indeed, one of charity
law's essentials.
Yet, other-regarding orientation is not alone sufficient. To
enforce mission accountability, each charity must also be governed by
a group, rather than by a single individual. Again, the tension
between the mission touchstone and the challenge of its enforcement
is the key. Society cannot and should not rigorously police the con-
tent of a charity's mission or the activities pursued in furtherance of it.
Strong group governance creates a means for dialogue about how a
charity meets and evolves its mission. Through collaboration and dis-
course, group governance offers an internal, structural solution for
policing charitable mission. Notably, however, this essential principle
is largely absent from current charity law. Charity law must be
reformed to embrace group governance forcefully.
The necessary reforms to charity law do not stop with this addi-
tion. An important excision is also required. Current charity law is
replete with attempts to prohibit or penalize charities' decisions to
engage in commercial or political activity. These doctrines go far
beyond discouraging self-regarding behavior and chill charities' pur-
suit of legitimate mission-related programs. Rather than promoting
discussion of whether a commercial or political activity will support a
charity's mission, these doctrines drive charities away from these activ-
Autonomy 24 (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-21, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1666421. Of
course, there are those who would prefer a more limited vision of charity for the law,
for example those who would require any entity recognized as a charity to be explic-
itly tied to relief of the poor.
2 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835, 838
(1980) ("A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it, such as
members, officers, directors, or trustees.").
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ities wholesale. This ill-fated attempt to guard the border 3 of what will
serve charitable mission has generated vague categories and myriad
exceptions that are easy for charities to avoid and nearly impossible
for courts and regulators to police. This body of law might be read to
suggest two further essentials: that charities should sharply limit their
commercial undertakings, and that they should eschew involvement
in politics. Such restrictions, however, are not essential to enforcing
mission and the current charity law expressing them is, for the most
part, wasted effort.
The time is ripe for a substantial reform of charity law, focusing it
on other-regarding orientation and group governance and eliminat-
ing its misguided fixation on commercial and political activities. The
rationalization of charity law would always be a welcome development
to better regulate traditional charities, but the speed and variety of
innovations blending charity and business demand action now.
Emphasizing other-regarding orientation and group governance will
allow us to discern and enforce the true line between charity and busi-
ness. Jettisoning the commercial and political restrictions on charities
will remove major impediments to innovators' use of traditional char-
ity forms. Focusing on charity law's true essentials will enable it to
respond to the exciting and sometimes vexing trend blurring charity
and business.
Part I reviews how current charity law distinguishes charities from
businesses, drawing on statutory pronouncements, regulatory activity,
and common law decisions based on state organizational law and fed-
eral and state tax law. The other-regarding orientation requirement is
fully expressed in these sources. The group governance norm's grip
on current charity law is more tenuous, and this Part will identify sev-
eral gaps that must be filled for it to achieve its potential as a struc-
tural solution to the challenge of enforcing mission accountability.
Finally, this Part reviews the substantial body of law restricting the
commercial and political activities of charities. Charting the contours
of these rules and doctrines reveals a landscape in need of reform.
Part II introduces myriad innovations mingling charity and busi-
ness that are pressuring charity law today. It argues these innovations
can best be understood and regulated by refocusing charity law on the
other-regarding orientation and group governance requirements
alone. For-profit or hybrid organizational forms used to pursue chari-
3 See John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 284-85 (Walter W. Powell & Rich-




table goals challenge the nondistribution constraint and other
prohibitions on self-regarding behavior. The social enterprise trend
also deeply challenges the group governance norm, as the structures
used to maintain social goals within a for-profit business rely on pre-
serving control with a founder. These challenges are serious and cut
to the core of charity law-enabling self-regulation of mission. They
highlight the need to continue charity law's vigilance regarding other-
regarding orientation and to amplify its commitment to group
governance.
Developments on the charity-business border are also pressuring
current charity law's restrictions on commercial and political activity.
Social enterprise, microfinance, and creative or philanthrocapitalism
challenge the idea that charitable mission and commercial activity are
incompatible. Social entrepreneurs who spurn charitable forms to
avoid their political restrictions suggest that political activity may be
necessary to achieve some charitable goals. Here, the experiences of
innovators demonstrate the gains to be made by removing many of
current charity law's limitations on commercial and political activity.
I. CuRRENT CHARITY LAW
At the outset it is important to clarify and limit my claims. I argue
that the other-regarding orientation and group governance require-
ments are the appropriate basis for the law's definition of a charity.
4
The concept of a charity is more limited than that of a nonprofit
organization more generally. Noncharitable entities may form as non-
profits, most commonly to pursue the mutual benefit of their mem-
bers, such as in social clubs and trade associations. 5 These entities
may engage in some charitable activities, but they are not charities.
The limitations that I argue are essential to charity status do not seri-
ously constrain mutual benefit organizations. The limited focus on
the proper emphasis of charity law also will not necessarily line up
precisely with the general public's conceptions of charity. Indeed,
gaps between any shared lay sense of charity's meaning and purpose
and the essentials of charity law could signal a need for charity law to
change.
4 This approach contrasts starkly with Professor Hill's proposal that federal tax
law should abandon the treatment of exempt organizations as entities in favor of
treating them as aggregates. See Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Effi-
ciency: Designing a Nondiversion Constraint, 56 SMU L. REV. 675, 700 (2003). Although I
share Professor Hill's conviction that avoiding diversion of charity resources should
be an important goal of charity law, I believe that an entity approach remains helpful.
5 See MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES §§ 23:01, 26:01 (2007) (dis-
cussing the nature of social clubs and trade associations generally).
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It is equally important to be clear about the sources of charity law
that I utilize. I look to the statutory, regulatory, and case law that
defines and constrains a charitable entity, as opposed to some other
type of entity (often a business). This body of charity law differenti-
ates charities from other entities that happen to engage in charitable
activities. This set of constitutive charity law, in my view, includes two
important sets of regimes. The first is the state law that limits access to
charitable forms of organization-principally, state nonprofit corpo-
ration and charitable trust law. 6 The second is tax law that defines the
charity category that entitles an entity to exemption. State property
tax exemption is provided to charities by various state constitutional
provisions or statutes. 7 Federal income tax exemption law includes
multiple classes of exempt entities.8 References to federal tax exemp-
tion refer to the most favored status for charitable entities, granted
under Internal Revenue Code § 501 (c) (3).9 It is important to distin-
guish this tax exemption regime from federal tax law delineating the
types of entities entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions.10
These rules are of great importance to charities and certainly motivate
their behavior; they also often contain limitations resonant of the
essentials I articulate. Yet, the deductibility regime is aimed at encour-
aging behavior by donors and does not explicitly guard access to char-
ity status. Therefore, I do not treat it as a primary source for the
charity law concepts considered here.
Of course, one might view only state organizational law as consti-
tutive of charity. Tax law might merely comprise political choices
about the types of activities government will subsidize, 1 without nec-
6 Although a nonprofit organization may take the legal form of a charitable trust
or an unincorporated association, most U.S. nonprofits are formed as nonprofit cor-
porations. See id. § 1:03. This Article primarily addresses this and the other formal
type of organization a charity may take, the charitable trust. See id. Charities can also
be formed as unincorporated associations, but there is very little legal authority
regarding such entities, which typically operate under agency principles. See id.
Therefore, I leave this form aside for now.
7 SeeJanne Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property-Tax Exemption, in PROPERm-
TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIEs 3, 4-6 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002).
8 See I.R.C. § 501 (2006).
9 Id. § 501 (c) (3).
10 See, e.g., id. § 170(c) (income tax deduction); id. § 2055 (estate tax deduction);
id. § 2522 (gift tax deduction).
11 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983)
(describing both deductibility and tax exemption as subsidies for charities' contribu-
tions to public welfare); see also Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31
B.C. L. REv. 501, 605-06, 606 n.292 (1990) (describing the "traditional subsidy theory
of the tax exemption for altruistic nonprofits" and cataloguing statements of courts
and commentators on this theory); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable
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essarily including forceful statements on what is a charity. In large
part, I share this view of the deductibility regime. Like other deduc-
tions, the charitable deduction is an expression of the government's
decision about what activities to subsidize. 12 I view the exemption
regimes under federal and state tax law, however, as quite different.
These exemptions are basic expressions by our legal, political, and
social systems about what types of entities are fully and truly charities.
Likewise, they screen out those types of entities that, while perhaps
deserving favor or praise for various reasons, are not charities. The
charity category identifies entities it would be improper to subject to
taxation, not merely those that the government might desire to subsi-
dize.' 3 Thus, to reiterate, when this Article speaks of charity law, it
refers both to state organizational law and federal and state tax
exemption law as its critical sources.
A. Other-Regarding Orientation
The requirement that charities maintain an other-regarding ori-
entation is ultimately a product of the basic tension between charity
law's commitment to mission and its inability to adequately patrol that
commitment. 14 This principle says that a charity must direct itself
Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 505, 517-28 (2010)
(accepting the view that tax exemption and deductibility are both tax subsidies in a
piece arguing for recognition that distributive justice plays a key role in explaining tax
benefits for charities); Simon et al., supra note 3, at 274-76 (reviewing subsidy ratio-
nales for tax exemption and deductibility).
12 See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REv. 531,
552-53 (2006) (describing the widespread acceptance of "the deduction . . . as a
government subsidy").
13 See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23J. CORP. L. 585, 587-96 (1998) (articulating a "sovereignty perspective"
on the tax benefits received by charity, arguing they derive from the treatment of
charities as quasi-sovereigns). Notably, Brody cautions that a sovereignty approach to
designing charitable tax benefits can both benefit and harm charities, as the govern-
ment may enact rules in order to control or limit the rival, quasi-sovereign charity. See
id. at 606. My view also shares some aspects with the "community interest" theory of
charity tax benefits. SeeJohnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political
Campaign Activity by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1071, 1083-84
(2007) [hereinafter Buckles, Peep]; Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory
of the Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 967-74 (2005) [hereinafter
Buckles, Community Income Theory].
14 Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEx L. REv. 1213, 1219 (2010) (disput-
ing the notion that a majority of the work currently done in the charitable sector
ought to be farmed out to for-profit firms, based partially on the notion that such a
step would compound the already vexing question of monitoring); Thomas L.
Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health
2011]
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toward a charitable class and provide the benefits of its success to
them: not to donors, not to equity investors, not to leaders or manag-
ers, not even to unrelated parties if they are outside the benefitted
class. 15 While this essential principle does not identify the particular
content that will comprise a charity's mission, it does mandate at least
this very basic level of altruism. As noted above, society cannot moni-
tor and police every activity or purpose that a charity might under-
take; indeed, it would be undesirable for it to do so even if such
regulation were possible. 16 However, by mandating an other-regard-
ing orientation, charity law sets the outside limits on the behavior in
which charities may engage. When a charity's leaders forsake the pur-
suit of benefits for others and turn instead to accruing benefits for
themselves, the entity veers off the permissible course and loses its
entitlement to charity status.
For much of the last three decades, legal academics have recog-
nized a single defining legal characteristic of charities: the nondis-
tribution constraint. 17  Charities may not distribute profits to
Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. H jm THPOL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 82-85 (2005) (describing the
difficult accountability question posed by nonprofits as entities with multiple stake-
holders and offering a "mission primacy" approach as a partial solution).
15 See Atkinson, supra note 11, at 566-99 (offering a view of the fundamental
value of charities based on altruism); Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Cor-
porations, 80 MICH. L. REv. 999, 1021 n.51 (1982) ("It has been said that the core
feature of charity is that it is not 'self-regarding,' but 'other regarding.'").
16 See Mayer, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing various potential "justification [s] for
charity autonomy"); Smith, supra note 1, at 347-55 (noting the benefits charities
enjoy as autonomous entities).
17 See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries ?, 23J. CORP. L. 655, 665 (1998) (referring to the nondistribution
constraint as the "defining feature" of nonprofits);John D. Colombo, Federal and State
Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and Healthcare for the Poor, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 433,
435 (2007) (referring to the nondistribution constraint as "the chief requirement" for
nonprofit status); Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corpora-
tions, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 132 (1993) ("The defining difference between a non-
profit and a for-profit corporation is the nondistribution constraint. . . ."); Daniel
Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAx L. REV. 133, 136 (2006) (noting
the nondistribution constraint as the distinguishing feature of nonprofit, versus for-
profit, entities); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organi-
zations, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 227, 230 (describing the nondistribution constraint as the
"[t]he defining characteristic of a charitable nonprofit"); see also Usha Rodrigues,
Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1701285 (arguing that due to the nondistribution constraint, nonprofits can
offer a unique kind of social identity benefit to their patrons, one that entities organ-
ized using other forms cannot provide).
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individuals or entities maintaining control positions within them.18 By
limiting its application to those with organizational control, the
nondistribution constraint is a slightly more limited statement of the
other-regarding orientation requirement. The core mandate that a
charity reinvest its residual earnings in its mission to serve others,
rather than route these earnings to individuals or entities outside its
intended benefitted class, is the same. The nondistribution con-
straint, however, focuses on individuals with organizational control.
This nondistribution constraint and the broader other-regarding
orientation requirement are strongly expressed by a plethora of legal
rules: state organizational law barring self-dealing by fiduciaries and
limiting distributions more generally; the restrictions on inurement,
private benefit, and excess benefit transactions under federal tax
exemption law; and the various tax, corporation, and trust law doc-
trines addressing charitable purpose and charitable class. This sub-
part offers a basic review of these rules, demonstrating the ways they
embody the other-regarding orientation requirement.
State law bars unfair self-dealing by charity fiduciaries.19 More
general prohibitions on distributions can also be found, some in state
nonprofit corporation statutes. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corpo-
ration Act (RMNCA), on which many state statutes are based, provides
a good example. It pointedly prohibits distributions,20 defined as "the
payment of a dividend or any part of the income or profit of a corpo-
ration to its members, directors or officers."21 Directors and officers
exercise organizational authority as fiduciaries. Statutory members,
when they exist, also possess some organizational control. They must
18 See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 838 ("A nonprofit organization is, in essence,
an organization that is barred from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals
who exercise control over it, such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.").
19 See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 195-99,
219-25 (2004); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 646 (1998).
20 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01-.02 (1987). Limited distri-
butions are permitted by mutual benefit corporations, but these noncharitable non-
profits fall outside the scope of this Article. Note that references to the RMNCA
herein indicate the 1987 version, which many jurisdictions have adopted. See
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 152 (reporting twenty-three adoptions in 2003).
They do not the refer to the recent product of the American Bar Association Section
on Business Law, Committee on Nonprofit Organizations, entitled the Model Non-
profit Corporation Act, Third Edition. This more recent work makes substantial
changes to the RMNCA to harmonize it with the Model Business Corporation Act. See
Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Stan-
dards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 701, 718 (2008).
21 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40(10).
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approve amendments to the articles of incorporation, mergers, and
dissolutions and can initiate changes in ongoing organizational opera-
tions through bylaw amendments.
22
Federal tax law imposes an other-regarding orientation require-
ment by defining those entities eligible for charitable exemption as
those in which "no part of the net earings... inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual."23 Three important doctrines
expand on this definitional limit: inurement, private benefit, and
excess benefit. Inurement doctrine targets organizational insiders,
banning those with control from receiving profits.24 The companion
private benefit doctrine prohibits substantial benefits accruing to any
private individual not provided as part of the entity's charitable activi-
ties. 25 Incidental benefits, presumably, are unavoidable and no cause
for penalty.2 6 In contrast, substantial benefits threaten to be favors for
those with control or a diversion from the other-regarding mission of
the organization.
Infringing either of these prohibitions carries the ultimate sanc-
tion: loss of exemption and exclusion from the charity category.
27 If
applied, this sanction puts a charity whose controlling parties engaged
in inurement out of business, deserting any charitable class the charity
might have helped. Yet, it leaves untouched the individuals who were
inappropriately benefitted. 2s The excess benefit statute and accompa-
22 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr §§ 10.03, 11.03, 12.02, 14.02
(requiring member approval in order for a nonprofit corporation to amend its arti-
cles, merge, sell all or substantially all of its assets, or dissolve); see also id. § 6.03 (not-
ing that nonprofit corporations need not have members at all).
Members under relevant nonprofit corporate statutes are granted governance
rights. It should be noted, however, that some charities use the term "member" to
recognize the financial or other contributions of particular individuals or to build the
organization's connection to them. These "affinity members" have no governance
rights and should be distinguished from statutory members. I thank Evelyn Brody for
this clarifying term.
23 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
24 See FREMONT-SMIT-, supra note 19, at 248-49; James J. Fishman, Wrong Way
Corrigan and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New Legal
Approaches, 76 FoRDHAM L. REv. 567, 584-85 (2007).
25 See Simon et al., supra note 3, at 282-83 (describing the private benefit doc-
trine and comparing it with both inurement and excess benefit).
26 Terri Lynn Helge, The Taxation of Cause-Related Marketing, 85 CHI.-KErr L. REv.
883, 931 (2010) ("If an organization provides more than incidental private benefit,
the organization's tax-exempt status may be revoked.").
27 FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 250.
28 See Helge, supra note 26, at 931-32 (discussing the potential ramifications of




nying regulations better align available remedies with the aim of main-
taining charities' other-regarding orientation. This regime imposes
penalty taxes on individuals with control who engage in transactions
with their charities, to the extent that such transactions result in the
individuals' receipt of excessive benefits. 29 In addition, the benefitted
party must make restitution. 30 The charity itself is made whole, not
penalized with loss of status, and may go on pursuing its other-regard-
ing mission. The expressive value of § 501 (c) (3)'s limitation on the
destination of net earnings 31 and the message of these doctrines could
not be clearer. An other-regarding orientation is an essential require-
ment for status as a charity under federal tax exemption law.
Many of the prohibitions on self-dealing and distributions epito-
mize the more specific nondistribution constraint, by limiting their
application to those with control.3 2 Yet, when these are taken along
with legal requirements addressing charitable class and purpose, the
more general requirement of other-regarding orientation comes into
view. For example, to create a charitable trust, its benefits must be
dedicated to some broad class of beneficiaries. 33 This class of others
must be benefitted by the trust, rather than the trustee, settlor, or a set
of private beneficiaries of the settlor's largesse. 34 These alternative
objects might be validly served by a private trust. The advantages of
charitable status, including exemption from the rule against perpetu-
ities and eligibility to pursue tax-favored status, are limited to those
charitable trusts that form and operate in this other-regarding
fashion.
35
Charitable purpose requirements, found in both state organiza-
tional and federal and state tax exemption law, also speak to other-
regarding orientation. Federal tax exemption is limited to entities
formed for "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes," and a few other specialized pur-
29 See I.R.C. § 4958 (2006); Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions, 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4958-1 (2002); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 252-64 (describing the
excess benefit regime at length).
30 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 259.
31 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3).
32 See FREMONT-SMIT, supra note 19, at 248-49; see also Fishman, supra note 24, at
584.
33 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Or TRUSTS § 28 (2003); 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities
§§ 69, 106 (2000).
34 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. g(2) ("[T]ihe rule against perpe-
tuities is somewhat relaxed when charitable purposes are involved .... ").
35 See id. § 29.
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poses.3 6 State statutes also frequently describe the purposes for which
charitable corporations may properly form. Some offer long lists of
purposes that are appropriate, such as New York's which includes
"civic, patriotic, political, social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural, horti-
cultural, and animal husbandry"37 purposes; others repeat (sometimes
with slight variation) the federal exempt purposes categories; and
some do both.38 Those statutes based on the RMNCA require charita-
ble corporations to declare themselves to be public benefit corpora-
tions or religious corporations.3 9 To qualify as a public benefit
corporation, an organization must either be deemed as such by state
statute, be exempt under § 501 (c) (3), or be "organized for a public or
charitable purpose."40 The statute defines neither "public" nor "chari-
table," but instead relies on the common law to determine their mean-
ing in specific cases. 41 Charitable trust law permits formation for a
range of purposes, generally including relief of poverty, advancement
of education, religion, health, and governmental, or municipal pur-
poses, as well as a catchall category of "other purposes.., beneficial to
the community." 42 State property tax exemptions granted by constitu-
tional mandate or legislation are likewise varied in their descriptions
of the exempt category, but often speak of "purely public charity" and
educational or religious purposes.
43
The law has struggled to provide a conclusive definition of chari-
table purpose. This struggle will not be resolved by my identification
of charity law's essentials here. Indeed, the search for a conclusive
definition of charitable purpose is a fool's errand, as the bounds of
charity must evolve over time in order to serve the changing needs of
36 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). Although many of the purpose requirements cited here
reference religious purposes, this Article sets aside religious organizations due to the
special constitutional and religious law issues they raise.
37 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2005).
38 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 127.
39 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 17.07 (1987).
40 Id.
41 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 127.
42 The Uniform Trust Code (now adopted in twenty-one states and under consid-
eration in three more) permits charitable trusts to be formed "for the relief of pov-
erty, the advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health,
governmental or municipal purposes, or other purposes the achievement of which is
beneficial to the community." UNIFORm TRUST CODE § 405(a) (2005); see also
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 120 (offering a similar list and referencing, addi-
tionally, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts).
43 See Evelyn Brody, All Charities Are Property-Tax Exempt, but Some Charities Are More




society and the public. Yet, one can see the influence of the other-
regarding orientation requirement in the core of the charity category
that various legal sources stake out. In each of the descriptors chosen,
one sees the idea of serving a greater or qualitatively different purpose
than one's own self-regarding needs. Sometimes this is expressed with
general notions of serving the public, or government purposes, or
pursuing what is charitable, whatever that might be held to mean in a
given time and context. Other times the description is more specific,
such as pursuing education, a mission that will include the teaching of
others or at least generating knowledge that could somehow serve the
community. By its demands on charitable purpose, vague as they may
be, the law expresses the idea that charity is appropriately directed
toward enriching the lives of others rather than enriching oneself.
Significant portions of current charity law are taken up by
embracing and expressing the other-regarding orientation require-
ment. A wide range of sources articulate the nondistribution con-
straint, as well as many other clear and forceful legal limitations on
self-regarding activity. These are pivotal concepts, but they do not
provide a sufficient prescription for how the law should define and
limit the charity category. Charity law must also block access to charity
status to single individuals or organizations controlled by a single indi-
vidual, even if it effectively restrains such individuals' abilities to bene-
fit personally from their organizations. It is to the contours of this
other vital essential that I now turn.
B. Group Governance
Charity law should powerfully defend its mission imperative by
requiring charities to use a strong group governance model. This
essential principle says that while a business can be formed and gov-
erned individually, a charity fundamentally requires more than one
person's desire to pursue some view of the good. A charity must be
governed by a group.
44
Again, understanding that charities' accountability to mission
must ultimately be self-policed is crucial to grasping the importance of
group governance. A charity is an entity pursuing some mission that
44 For an economic account of nonprofit entities keyed to this concept of a
defined group, see Woods Bowman, DePaul Univ., Presentation to the 38th Annual
Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Volun-
tary Action: What Is Nonprofit? The Nondistribution Constraint Revisited (Nov. 20,
2009) (on file with author). Bowman argues charities are defined by the combination
of benefits being vested in a constituency as a group and control, albeit weak, by that
group. See id. at 3 & fig.1.
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is of value (or at least potential value) to society (or some segment of
it). But, charity regulators cannot and should not vigorously police
mission. Regulators' litigation and tax enforcement tools are ill suited
to evaluating faithfulness to charitable missions. Moreover, reliance
on public enforcement of charitable mission would seriously threaten
charitable autonomy and perhaps infringe on associational rights.
45
Some internal method is required to encourage charities themselves
to pursue a mission that will ultimately benefit society and to do so by
appropriate means. This method is the dialogic process, among a
group, whereby a charity formulates its mission and transforms this
mission and its practices over time. No single person can be trusted to
challenge the continuing benefit of an articulated mission. No indi-
vidual can be counted on to sufficiently vet whether particular pro-
grams or activities appropriately serve it.46 The model of individual
governance simply does not offer a solution to the challenge of regu-
lating charitable mission. The collaboration and dialogue required by
a strong model of group governance is such a solution.
47
Current charity law occasionally gives voice to group governance
norms. State nonprofit corporation law generally requires at least a
three-member board of directors to govern an incorporated charity.
4 8
45 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Compre-
hensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 205, 226-30 (2004).
46 Commentators have frequently noted the multiple constituencies inherent in
charitable organizations. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Eco-
nomic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 457, 519-35 (1996); Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling
Through the Gaps Between Law and Practice, 76 FoRDHAm L. REV. 521, 526-27 (2007);
Greaney & Boozang, supra note 14, at 82-84.
47 See Norman I. Silber, Anticonsultative Trends in Nonprofit Governance, 86 OR. L.
REV. 65, 97 (2007) (criticizing the trend away from "consultative" or "collaborative"
governance models as potentially impoverishing both the governance and mission
achievement of individual charities as well as contributing to a loss of social capital);
see also Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability 9 (European Govern-
ance Paper No. C-06-01, 2006), available at http://www.connex-network.org/
eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-CA6-O1.pdf (describing "public accountability" as "a rela-
tionship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to
explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judg-
ment, and the actor may face consequences" (emphasis omitted)); Edmund Douglas
Hayward Flack, The Role of Annual Reports in a System of Accountability for Public
Fundraising Charities (Jan. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Queensland Uni-
versity of Technology), available at http://eprints.qut.edu.au/16362/1/-Edmund-
FlackThesis.pdf (adopting this forum-based accountability model in the charity
context).
48 See, e.g., REVSED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Act § 8.03 (1987) (requiring that a
board of directors "must consist of three or more individuals"); Evelyn Brody, Charity
Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 645 (2005);
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Further, boards of directors must act as a group, either by majority
vote at a meeting in which a quorum is present or by unanimous writ-
ten consent.49 Although a few states permit a single director, this
minority rule has been criticized.50 In contrast, charitable trust law
generally permits a settlor to appoint a single trustee, 51 though again
this structure has been criticized.52 Any future governance personnel
changes can be provided by trust documents or filled in by courts as
the need arises. 53 Trust law does offer settlors considerable freedom
to alter the means of trust governance as they desire, and some set-
tlors have established board-like governance for individual trusts.
54
This technique, however, is neither required nor customary. Even
without adopting a board-like system, group governance remains the
default rule in charitable trusts with more than one trustee, and they
may act by majority decision. 55 Yet, trust law's flexible approach also
allows settlors to allocate authority over particular roles or functions
to a single trustee, which allocation may relieve cotrustees of responsi-
bility for those functions.
5 6
Existing critiques of single fiduciary charities cite their vulnerabil-
ity to fraud-by the actions of others or a fiduciary's own base
motives.57 Additionally, governance by a single individual leaves little
opportunity for the vetting of decisions to ensure that they are effi-
cient and wise. 58 More importantly here, though, the group govern-
see also UK CHATmY COMM'N, CHARITABLE COMPANIES: MODEL MEMORANDUM AND ARTI-
CLES OF ASSOCIATION 17 (2009), available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/
Library/guidance/gdltext.pdf (requiring at least three directors).
49 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT §§ 8.21, 8.24.
50 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
ETHICAL PRACTICE 16 (2007), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/
principles/principles-guide.pdf (noting, in a report produced in response to a Sen-
ate Finance Committee request, that a panel of experts had recommended that a
minimum of five directors be required for an incorporated charity to qualify for fed-
eral tax exemption).
51 See Brody, supra note 48, at 645.
52 See id. at 672 ("[S]ingle-director and single-trusteed charities seem to invite
failures of proper independence and protection of the public interest.").
53 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 34(2) (2003).
54 Stanford University is one well-known example of this trust governance alterna-
tive. See Stanford Facts: Finances, STAN. U., http://www.stanford.edu/about/facts/
finances.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 39, 81. See generally Brody, supra note
48, at 663-65.
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. b.
57 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 50, at 21-22; Brody, supra
note 48, at 661-68.
58 See Brody, supra note 48, at 661-68.
20111
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ance concept maps onto concerns that charity not be enabled and
ennobled to create a personal fiefdom, but rather to pursue some mis-
sion for the benefit of society. A charity governed by a single individ-
ual offers no proxy for articulating or monitoring the public or
common good in whose name it is created and maintained.
The group governance norm is also subtly at work in those few
state law provisions requiring independent directors. Five states spe-
cifically require a set percentage (usually a majority) of nonprofit cor-
porate directors to qualify as independent. 59 The RMNCA includes
such a requirement as an optional provision.60 These requirements
focus on and attempt to limit the familial or financial connections
between a director and her charity and its other directors and leaders.
For example, Maine permits no more than forty-nine percent of a
charitable corporation's directors to be "financially interested per-
sons," receiving compensation from the charity or having a close fam-
ily relationship with someone who does. 61 Such independence
requirements in part respond to the concerns underlying the other-
regarding orientation requirement. They seek to avoid financial con-
flicts whereby individuals personally benefit from the charity rather
than directing its resources toward the good of others, or at least to
preserve the charity's ability to manage such conflicts when they
occur.6 2 The other major concerns underpinning independence
requirements, however, are to ensure objectivity of board members
and prevent domination by one or more interested individuals.
63
These concerns are linked to the need for group governance. A
board with a true mix of members allows for genuine give-and-take on
all topics, including questions of mission. A single dominant individ-
ual surrounding herself with relatives or cronies will not.
Of course, the group governance norm could be even more
strongly embodied, such as by a requirement that charities have voting
59 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227(a) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-B, § 713-
A(2) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:6-a (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-33-27(2)
(2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. lB, § 8.13(a) (1997).
60 See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 8.13 (1987).
61 See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-B, § 713-A(2); see also; cf REVISED MODEL NOrPROFrr
CORP. AcT § 8.13 (providing an optional provision with this language); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 292:6-a (1999) (imposing a different independence requirement that
charity boards be composed of at least five directors "who are not of the same immedi-
ate family or related by blood or marriage").
62 See Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate
Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REv. 83, 99 (2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Indepen-
dence in the Independent Sector, 76 FoRm-tAm L. REV. 795, 807-09, 814-15 (2007).




members as well as a representative and deliberative method of gov-
ernance including them. Current charity law does not embrace this
view. Instead, a voting member governance structure is optional for
incorporated charities and, in practice, little used by them. 64 Even
when charities do opt to empower a group of individuals as voting
members, courts do not always hold them strictly to the structures
required by their formative documents. This would empower the gov-
erning group by enforcing its role in the governance process. But
when tested, courts have declined to reinforce group governance
norms ardently.
65
In fact, the voting membership structure is most frequently
encountered in a situation that undermines the group governance
norm. Charities desiring to create parent-subsidiary relationships
often establish the charity parent as the sole member of its subsidiary
charity. This sole member's monopoly on voting rights allows it to
elect the entire subsidiary board.66 This sole voting member variant
poses obvious problems for a robust idea of group governance.
Despite the existence of a member and perhaps multiple nominal
directors on the subsidiary's board, a single entity-the corporate par-
ent-has all of the power. In sum, nonprofit organizational law and
practice embracing the group governing norm is decidedly thin.
Federal tax exemption law is agnostic among the organizational
forms qualifying charities might take, and likewise takes no strong
position on exempt organizations' commitment to group governance.
A § 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt entity may be a "corporation (or unincorpo-
rated association), community chest, fund, or foundation."67 These
state forms require only the bare level of group governance described
above. 68 A few years ago, a congressional committee's staff considered
requiring incorporated exempt charities to have at least three direc-
tors, a majority of whom were independent. 69 The proposals were not
64 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 159. Even in groups with a nominal num-
ber of voting members, these individuals are often the same individuals who serve as
directors. See id.
65 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market for Mission
Contro4 2006 BYU L. REv. 1181, 1231-45 (describing and critiquing court enforce-
ment of member voting processes).
66 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties: Defining the Duties of
Parent Corporations Acting as Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Health Care Systems, 53
RUTGERS L. Riw. 979, 1005-09 (2001).
67 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
68 See, e.g., REviSED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.03 (1987) (requiring only
that a board consist of at least three members).
69 See STAFF OF S. FIN. COMM., 108TH CONG., TAx EXEMPT GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS
(Discussion Draft 2004).
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adopted, but the IRS's recent guidance on good governance for chari-
ties does include recommendations that charities consider the perils
of small boards and the desirability of independence. 70 Additionally,
the newly revised Form 990, the principal charity tax reporting form,
now inquires as to the number and independence of the members of
a charity's governing body. 71 These developments express support for
the group governance norm, but fall short of mandating it.
State law extends its property tax exemption only to organizations
that qualify as charities, using the organizational forms already
addressed and incorporating their limited group governance
demands.72 Other than this, state property tax exemption law does
not speak to group governance.
Current charity law makes far too weak a commitment to group
governance. The trust form allows charities to avoid group govern-
ance altogether. Even where a norm of group governance is articu-
lated, as in nonprofit corporate law, the group required need not be
large, nor must it be particularly diverse or democratically governed.
Federal and state tax exemption law incorporate these requirements
and federal law has made some gestures toward a stronger commit-
ment. In order for charity law to effectively defend the mission imper-
ative, it must be augmented to more fully and energetically commit to
group governance.
C. Anticommerciality
In contrast, current charity law is cluttered with restrictions on
categories of charities' activities. Current charity law constrains com-
mercial activity even if the profits it generates are fully committed to
reinvestment in charitable mission. It also restricts political activity
even when undertaken in service of a charitable class. These limita-
tions are so substantial and so complex as to suggest that avoiding
commercial and political activities is likewise essential to safeguarding
charities' missions. This subpart and the next take up the commercial
and political limitations in turn, identifying the current charity law
70 See Governance and Related Topics-501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS.Gov, 3 (2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance-practices.pdf. For a critique of the
IRS's charity governance initiative, see James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's
Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545 (2010).
71 See I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Part VI
(OMB No. 1545-0047) (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf
(setting forth a full page of questions related to the entity's governing body manage-
ment policies and public disclosures).
72 See Gallagher, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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embodying them and revealing their tenuous links to mission
accountability.
Charities may and do conduct commercial activities, both related
and unrelated to their missions. Indeed, the scope of the commercial
activities in which charities engage is large and growing.73 State orga-
nizational law imposes few restrictions on these activities. Occasional
state nonprofit corporation statutes limit charities' conduct of com-
mercial activities, though most permit such activities outright.74 Char-
itable trust law likewise takes a permissive tone, setting no general
limitations on charitable trusts' pursuit of commercial activities,
though it tends not to speak specifically to the desirability of charita-
ble trustees running businesses. 75 Thus, organizations may adopt the
legal forms used by charities with little concern regarding their com-
mercial activities.
76
In contrast, qualifying for state property and federal income tax
advantages will subject a charity's commercial activities to significant
scrutiny.77 Property tax exemption is often founded on state constitu-
tional provisions exempting property belonging to charities, public
charities, or institutions of purely public charity.78 In addition, juris-
dictions require property to be used solely for such purposes; exemp-
73 See Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steurle, Scope and Dimensions of the Nonprofit
Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 66, 74-76 &
tbl.3.6 (describing and tabulating the considerable share of nonprofit revenues gener-
ated from fees for services); Dennis R. Young & Lester M. Salamon, Commercialization,
Social Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 423,
430-36 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (cataloguing the nonprofit sector's "growing
reliance on earned income" as well as the trend of nonprofits "integrating the market
into the pursuit of their social missions in a more fundamental way"); Burton A. Weis-
brod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing Links Between Nonprofits and the
Rest of the Economy, in To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT 1, 16 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed.,
1998) (describing the increasing dependence of nonprofits on revenues from com-
mercial activities) [hereinafter Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission]; Burton A. Weisbrod,
The Pitfalls of Profits, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2004, at '40, 43 [hereinafter
Weisbrod, Pitfalls].
74 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 3.01(a), 3.02(16-d) (1987) (setting
the default purpose of nonprofit corporations as "[to] engag[e] in any lawful activity"
and empowering them "to carry on a business").
75 UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 404 (2005) (requiring charitable trusts to pursue pur-
poses that are "lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve" and
noting an intention to encourage third parties to engage in commercial transactions
with trustees).
76 See Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations, in NONPROFITS &
BUSINESS 83, 84 (JosephJ. Cordes & C. Eugene Steurle eds., 2008) ("Nonprofit corpo-
ration law has surprisingly little to say about business activity as such.").
77 See id.
78 See Gallagher, supra note 7, at 10.
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tions for property owned by charities but not used for charitable
purposes can be refused, revoked, or apportioned.79 Furthermore,
the conduct of commercial activities, particularly unrelated busi-
nesses, can limit or scuttle exemption despite an organization's other-
wise charitable purposes.80
Many states use a multifactor test to determine eligibility for
property tax exemption.8' The factors differ across jurisdictions
somewhat, but two frequent factors bear directly on charities' com-
mercial activity. First, these tests exclude property operated for profit,
reserving special scrutiny for those entities supported by fees charged
for their services.8 2 Second, a few tests explicitly consider whether a
charity seeking property tax exemption competes with for-profit busi-
nesses.8 3 Using these and other rationales, a wide range of states have
mounted challenges to property tax exemption for property used for
nursing homes and retirement centers, day care centers, and, most
prevalently, hospitals and other healthcare activities. 84 Such chal-
lenges often complain that the entity in question charges market rates
for services, with some noting that they are "indistinguishable" from
commercial entities.
8 5
Many of these challenges are also tied to concerns about the level
of free care provided and whether the entities in question in fact
lessen the burdens to be borne by government.8 6 While not directly
turning on the question of whether or not an entity is engaged in
commercial activities, these questions do look to a sense of difference.
79 See id. at 7-10.
80 See John D. Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial
Activities by Charities, 76 FoRDutAM L. REv. 667, 670-72 (2007).
81 See Brody, supra note 43, at 625-32, app. at 671-732; Evelyn Brody, The States'
Growing Use of a Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale for the Charity Property-Tax Exemption, 56 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 269, 275-76 (2007); Gallagher, supra note 7, at 11.
82 See Brody, supra note 81, at 277-79 (collecting cases applying a prohibition on
high user fees for entities qualifying for the charity property tax exemption).
83 See id. (collecting cases from various states and noting that "[tlhe existence of
for-profit competitors is generally not enough to render property taxable, although
courts do consider competition a factor").
84 See Brody, supra note 81, at 279-83; Gallagher, supra note 7, at 12-14.
85 See, e.g., Surtees v. Carlton Cove, Inc., 974 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (Ala. Civ. App.
2007); Presbyterian Residence Ctr. Corp. v. Wagner, 411 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (App. Div.
1978). In Under the Rainbow Child Care Center, Inc. v. County of Goodhue, 741 N.W.2d
880, 892-96 (Minn. 2007), the court made explicit findings that a child care center
providing its services at or above market rates and with no provision for free care was
properly denied property tax exemption. The case was, however, significantly under-
mined by a subsequent statute allowing applicants for property tax exemption to pro-
vide justification for a lack of free services. See Brody, supra note 43, at 632.
86 See Brody, supra note 43, at 645-54; Brody, supra note 81, at 276-77.
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This dichotomy bolsters the concept that charity must be something
qualitatively distinct from commercial activity, perhaps by providing
some of its services gratis or by engaging in quasi-governmental activity
that businesses would presumably shun. Throughout state property
tax exemption law, the skepticism around commercial activity by char-
ities is prominent, relevant, and sometimes determinative.
Federal tax exemption law further reflects the fundamental suspi-
cion regarding charities' commercial activity in at least two sets of doc-
trine. Entities found to be overly "commercial" will be ineligible for
exemption as charities.8 7 In addition, the unrelated business income
tax (UBIT) taxes income generated from unrelated business activities
at the highest corporate or trust rate.8 8 Much of this area of law is
murky; indeed, it has become a commonplace to describe it as such.8 9
Yet, it is worth reviewing to reveal its anticommerciality bent.
Although outright prohibition of commercial activity can be
found,90 federal tax law concerns itself mostly with the extent of this
activity and its nexus with an entity's exempt purposes-tax law's term
for permissible charitable missions.91 Regulations allow for exemp-
tion despite a charity's operation of a trade or business as a substantial
part of its activities if the operation of such trade or business is in
furtherance of the organization's exempt purposes and if the organi-
zation is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carry-
87 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 25.1-.2 (7th
ed. 1998); Colombo, supra note 80, at 669-79 (summarizing current tax rules on com-
merciality); Hill, supra note 4, at 695-700 (same); see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note
19, at 247-48 (noting that the so-called "commerciality doctrine" was "extrapolated
from cases upholding the Service's denial of exemption on the basis that the opera-
tion of the charity in question was more in the nature of a commercial business oper-
ating in competition with for-profit companies," rather than expressed in the Internal
Revenue Code).
88 See I.R.C. § 511 (2006). Tax rules also address how related entities will be
treated for exemption and UBIT purposes. These rules, generally not created specifi-
cally for the exemption context, have created incentives for charities to create com-
plex structures in order to maximize exemption and minimize tax payments due. See
Colombo, supra note 80, at 679-80; see also Douglas M. Mancino, McDermott Will &
Emery LLP, Presentation at the Architecture of Charities' Commercial Activities Con-
ference: Structural Relations: Basic Structures 15-65 (2008) (on file with author);
Stephen Schwarz, Presentation at the Architecture of Charities' Commercial Activities
Conference: Managing Complex Structures 3-31 (2008) (on file with author).
89 SeeJAMESJ. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 596 (3d
ed. 2006) (summarizing these concerns with the characterization of this doctrine as
"untidy").
90 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (b) (1) (iii) (2005) (using "a manufacturing busi-
ness" as an example of nonexempt activity precluding exemption).
91 See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1).
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ing on an unrelated trade or business.92 Further, the regulations
explain that it is relevant to compare "the size and extent of the trade
or business and the size and extent of the activities which are in fur-
therance of one or more exempt purposes." 93 This would appear to
allow commercial activities, so long as they are insubstantial in com-
parison to exempt activities, and even substantial commercial activi-
ties, so long as they are in furtherance of exempt purposes.
Substantial commercial activities not in furtherance of exempt pur-
poses, however, raise the specter of a primary nonexempt purpose
and jeopardize exemption.
94
Practically, though, the IRS and the courts tend to focus instead
on how a charity conducts its commercial operations and whether this
manner of operation appears similar to that of a for-profit.95 A charity
takes on an impermissible "commercial hue" when it uses a commer-
cial pricing structure, selects products for their market appeal, adver-
tises to a mass market, etc. 96 The size of the charity's profits is also
often relevant. Too much income from commercial activity, especially
relative to expenditures on charitable activities, endangers exemp-
tion. 97 Neither of these strains of analysis directly focuses on whether
commercial activity is "in furtherance of exempt purposes" and even
this general summary suggests more consistency than one finds in reg-
ulatory and judicial rulings. 98
Federal tax law also hampers charities' unrelated commercial
activity even when it is not sufficiently substantial to exclude an entity
from the charity category altogether. Rather than prohibiting or lim-
iting this behavior outright, the UBIT taxes income derived from it.
UBIT taxes income generated by a "trade or business."99 Almost any-
thing done for income will qualify, and the regulations define trade or
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See Schwarz, supra note 88, at 10-11 (noting this "conventional wisdom").
95 See Brody, supra note 76, at 93 ("Case law tends to support the perhaps unfor-
tunate result that nonprofits are often punished for efficient commercial
operations.").
96 See HOPKINS, supra note 87, at 77-82; Brody, supra note 76, at 93-95; Colombo,
supra note 80, at 675-79.
97 See HOPKINS, supra note 87, at 80-82; Brody, supra note 76, at 93-95; Colombo,
supra note 80, at 675-76.
98 See Colombo, supra note 80, at 675 ("[T]he case law has evolved into asking
whether a particular activity has a commercial hue, and if so, whether it is substantial.
Positive answers to these questions generally lead to loss of tax exemption, though
even here the analysis is variable.").
99 See I.R.C. § 511 (2006).
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business activities narrowly. 100 Therefore, when sales are made to dis-
tinct groups or of distinct products, or an entity sells advertising
within a related publication, each is treated as a separate trade or busi-
ness activity under UBIT. The activity must also be "regularly carried
on,"10 1 defined as frequent and continuous as compared with the con-
duct of the activity in its usual course.102 Finally, the activity must not
be "substantially related to [the charity's] exempt purposes." 103 Sub-
stantial relationship depends on whether an activity "contributes
importantly" to the accomplishment of exempt purposes. 10 4 This test
is one of facts and circumstances, but the activity's size, extent, and
potential to compete with commercial firms are all important
factors.
10 5
Various exceptions limit UBIT's application, 10 6 and a UBIT-pay-
ing charity may take all of the deductions that would otherwise be
available to a taxable entity paying tax on the relevant income.10 7 As a
result of the sophisticated use of exceptions, deductions, and separate
entities, and perhaps charities' fears about entering commercial ven-
tures due to exemption risk, the UBIT collects relatively little reve-
nue.10 8 Yet, its message remains obvious: commercial activity is
suspect and charities who engage in it will be subject to scrutiny and
doubt. 109
100 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (2005) (defining a trade or business as "any activity
carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of
services").
101 See I.R.C. § 512.
102 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c). For example, a summertime ice cream shop at a
community center will be carried on regularly, whereas a sundae-selling event once a
year will not.
103 I.R.C. § 513.
104 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1)-(2).
105 See id.
106 See I.R.C. § 512(b); I.R.C. § 513(d)-(j). For a more detailed discussion of the
UBIT, see FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 289-95, and Brody, supra note 76, at
96-100.
107 SeeI.R.C. §511(a)(1).
108 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 295 (reporting the consensus of the con-
ferees attending a 1999 meeting "that UBIT has in effect 'become a voluntary tax'");
Grant Williams, Many Charities Avoid Business-Income Tax, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Apr.
23, 2009, at 27 (reporting studies that show that only forty percent of charities report-
ing receiving UBI in 2005 paid any tax on it and that fifty-one percent of charities in a
2008 study listed their UBIT as zero following deductions and other calculations).
109 See Brody, supra note 76, at 113 (mentioning UBIT's "symbolic value to policy-
makers and the public"); Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History
and the Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1478, 1544
(2005) (proposing the purpose of UBIT is to "deter[ ] charities from engaging in
activities that look bad").
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Current charity law is not as strident about charities' commercial
activities as it is about self-regarding ones. It says commercial activities
are suspect, not forbidden. Yet, the law speaks volumes on the sub-
ject, evaluating gradations of acceptable activity and imposing mea-
sured penalties. Despite the complexity and sometimes confusion of
this body of law, it articulates a strong distrust of charities' commercial
activities, whatever the use of the funds they generate. This message
might lead one to believe an anticommerciality position is essential to
charity law.
The question remains, however, whether charity law's focus on
identifying and restricting commercial activities is indeed necessary to
enforce its mission imperative. Society wants charities to focus on
their missions so they can generate the societal gains for which they
are prized and privileged. When a charity engages in commercial
activities, concerns arise that this focus and these gains could be lost.
First, there is the diversion concern.' 10 If the charity and its leaders
begin engaging in commercial activities, perhaps they will become dis-
tracted from their core mission and overly involved with the entity's
business activities.111 A community theater that opens a coffee house
to enhance its revenue stream might lose track of its cultural mission
while embroiled in the day-to-day operations of the business. When
the commercial activity is an inherent part of a group's charitable mis-
sion, such as with schools that sell education services or hospitals that
sell health care, the diversion concern is subtler. Individual product
lines that compete with for-profit providers or are offered to students
or patients paying market rates may be launched to generate revenue
to subsidize mission-related programs. Yet, these activities could possi-
bly capture leaders' attention and distract them from goals and activi-
ties closer to the core of a charity's mission.112
110 See John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 487, 534-44 (2002) (describing the diversion concern and the related
concern that commercial activities might signal a charity does not deserve various tax
benefits); see also Hill, supra note 4, at 700-01 (arguing for a new tax regime imposing
a "nondiversion constraint" to limit the use of exempt resources for nonexempt pur-
poses, including commercial and political activities).
111 See SEEDCO Potucy CmR., THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL ErNTRPRISE 7 (2007), available at
http://www.seedco.org/download/?id=10; Colombo, supra note 110, at 534-35; Weis-
brod, Pitfalls, supra note 73, at 44.
112 See Mayer, supra note 1, at 57 (noting this concern, and offering the insight
that this diversion may not be due to the bad faith of charity fiduciaries, but merely
due to the irresistible influence of its consumers).
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In each case, of course, the converse could also be true: the com-
mercial activities could reinforce the charity's pursuit of its mission. 113
The coffee house could raise needed revenue to allow the theater
group to mount more or move ambitious productions or to reduce
ticket prices to encourage a more socioeconomically diverse audience.
It could even draw new artists and theatergoers through the theater's
doors. Schools' and hospitals' market product lines could likewise
subsidize their less profitable teaching and healing activities, improve
the skills of their faculties and physicians, or spread the word about
their core mission offerings to a wider community. Current charity
law restricting commercial activities is, if anything, an imperfect proxy
for addressing the mission question that charities can best answer for
themselves.
A second concern about charities' commercial activities also casts
charity law's limits on commerciality in this proxy role. This concern
suggests that commercial businesses that do not generate the social
goods expected of charities could elide the relatively lax enforcement
apparatus and thereby improperly obtain benefits intended only for
charities. They would be "for-profit[s] in disguise."1 14 This would
inappropriately drain the public fisc, reducing societal resources with-
out obtaining the social returns that expenditures on true charities
produce.11 5 It also could result in reputational costs for true charities,
as the public would become less trusting that charities are beneficial
to society and deserving of the benefits that they enjoy.116 Again, cur-
rent charity law warns against commercial activities and limits and
penalizes them when they are undertaken as a messy proxy for arrest-
ing mission-threatening activities.
Under current charity law, commercial activities raise a red flag as
to whether a charity is truly focused on its charitable mission or has
become at best distracted, and at worst, a front for a business enter-
prise. Commercial activity is easier for regulators to observe and
superficially appears more appropriate for them to regulate than the
harder questions of whether a charity has veered from its legitimate
mission. But, ultimately, it is the mission question that charity law
should care about. The anticommerciality position articulated by cur-
rent charity law chills potentially useful activity, as well as each char-
ity's own dialogue about how best to pursue its mission.
113 SeeJ. Gregory Dees, Enterprising Nonprofits, HARv. Bus. REv.,Jan.-Feb. 1998, at
55-67.
114 See BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 11 (1988).
115 See id. at 11-13; Colombo, supra note 110, at 532-34.
116 See WEISBROD, supra note 114, at 13-14.
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D. Limitations on Political Activities
Like the anticommerciality thread in current charity law, a signifi-
cant body of cases, statutes, and regulations devote themselves to
restricting charities' involvement in the political process. Federal tax
law takes a fairly prophylactic approach. Section 501 (c) (3) admits to
exempt status only charities for which "influencing legislation" is "no
substantial part" of their activities.1 17 Regulations do not offer a mea-
sure of substantiality,1 18 but the few cases addressing the topic suggest
a fairly low ceiling.119 The chilling effect of this uncertainty leads
some charities to elect a series of optional and complex, but more
quantifiable, restrictions.' 20  These restrictions require lobbying
expenditures to be maintained below a maximum twenty percent of
the entity's operating budget.1 21 Private foundations, which are gen-
erally charities with a small group of funders, are not permitted to
engage in any lobbying whatsoever. 122 In addition to the lobbying
limits, all categories of federally exempt charity are banned from polit-
ical campaign activity. 123 The IRS will apply penalty taxes or revoke a
charity's exempt status for supporting or opposing candidates.
124
117 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
118 See generally Developments in the Law: Nonprofit Corporations, 105 I-HARv. L. REV.
1578, 1662 (1992) (emphasizing that neither the IRS nor the courts have determined
what percentage of its income a nonprofit corporation may spend on lobbying before
its efforts will be deemed "substantial").
119 See, e.g., Seasongood v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955) (holding
less than five percent of political activity not to be substantial); Haswell v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (eschewing a percentage rule, but finding
an organization with political actions comprising approximately twenty percent of its
activity ineligible to receive tax deductible contributions).
120 See Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 62-67 & n.379 (2003) (noting groups' claims that the "no substan-
tial part" test chilled lobbying made in the hearings on the new regime).
121 See I.R.C. § 4911 (c)(2). The statute imposes a sliding scale, permitting lobby-
ing expenditures up to twenty percent of an organization's exempt purpose expendi-
tures, provided these are $500,000 or less, and lower percentages of such
expenditures as the overall budget rises. See id. Overages result in penalty taxes;
repeat offenders can lose exemption. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3 (2005).
122 See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1) (subjecting any lobbying expenditures by a private
foundation to prohibitive penalty taxes).
123 See id. § 501(c) (3) (stating that "no part of the net earnings of" a tax-exempt
public charity may be used to "participate in, or intervene in . . . any political cam-
paign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office").
124 See id. § 4955 (taxing campaign expenditures by any exempt organization); id.
§ 4945(d) (2) (subjecting campaign activity by a private foundation to additional pro-
hibitive penalty taxes); see, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141-42
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As sweeping as the federal political limitations might seem, chari-
ties of sufficient size and sophistication can use a range of techniques
to work around them. If an otherwise charitable entity wishes to
engage in greater political activity than § 501 (c) (3) will allow, it may
form instead as a social welfare organization under § 501(c) (4).125
Such an entity may attempt to influence legislation, so long as these
attempts are germane to its social welfare purposes. 126 In fact, ger-
mane attempts to influence legislation may even be the primary pur-
pose of an entity exempt under § 501(c) (4).127 Status under
§ 501(c) (4) does not, however, throw open the door to unfettered
involvement in politics. If political campaign activities become the
primary activity of a § 501 (c) (4) organization, it will no longer qualify
for exemption under that section and will become partially subject to
tax. 128 Status under § 501(c) (4) thus provides only limited exemp-
tion, and it does not authorize receipt of tax-deductible contribu-
tions.129  Indeed, enforcing the prohibition on receiving such
contributions may well be the major reason they are shunted into this
lesser category. Relegating charities with substantial political activities
to this different and less favored strongly expresses the conviction that
charity and politics should remain distinct.
Of course, a sophisticated charity with political objectives may
split into multiple entities to maximize both the tax advantages the
charity can attain and the political activities in which it can engage.
The split entities are then linked together to the extent permissible
without jeopardizing this delicate balance. Dual structures, involving
an exempt § 501 (c) (3) organization and an affiliated entity organized
under § 501(c) (4), permit more lobbying, but require extra adminis-
trative burdens to avoid commingling and to maintain overlapping
boards.1 3 0 Triad structures, which add a § 527 political organization,
allow lobbying and campaign activities, but impose additional admin-
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming IRS revocation of a church's exempt status due to cam-
paign activities).
125 I.R.C. § 501 (c) (4).
126 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 33,495 (Apr. 27, 1967).
127 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,212 (Oct. 22, 1969).
128 See Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 C.B. 237 ("The fact that the organization's only
activities may involve advocating for changes in the law does not preclude the organi-
zation from qualifying under section 501(c) (4) of the Code."); I.R.C. § 527(f); Treas.
Reg. § 1.501 (c) (4)-1 (a) (2) (ii) (2005).
129 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (4)-1(a) (2) (ii).
130 See Simon et al., supra note 3, at 285 (discussing this "sibling option"). The
dual structure has been blessed, and some would say made constitutionally
mandatory, by the U.S. Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash-
ington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), discussed infra note 283 and accompanying text.
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istrative burdens because separate incorporation or banking is
required, as is some significant distinction among boards.131 These
complex structures permit a charity to maintain the most favored
charity status under federal tax exemption law, while related entities
engage in substantial political activity. Still, the burden of creating
and maintaining affiliated structures is one that many charities cannot
bear, and imposing it demonstrates again the disfavor charity law has
for political activity.
State law instructing charities to eschew politics is more limited
and varied. A few old precedents remain on the books branding such
purposes outside the charitable category.1 32 Generally, though, state
courts presented with the question have resolved that a nonprofit cor-
poration or charitable trust may be formed with the partial or exclu-
sive purpose of changing existing law.133 Entities formed to promote
political parties, however, are distinguished from those pursuing
social causes the achievement of which would require a change in law,
and are held not charitable.1 34 Even if nonprofit corporate or charita-
ble trust status will not be threatened by political purposes, qualifica-
tion for state property tax exemption is another story. Although state
statutes do not tend to call out political activities as a threat to prop-
erty tax exemption, precedents in a variety of states assert that politi-
cal activities will scuttle exemption for particular organizations or
property uses.13
5
131 See Simon et al., supra note 3, at 285 (describing this as a "double sibling struc-
ture" and noting its blessing in Branch Ministries v. Rosotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir.
2000)).
132 See, e.g., Workmen's Circle Educ. Ctr. v. Bd. of Assessors, 51 N.E.2d 313,
315-17 (Mass. 1943); Bowditch v. Att'y Gen., 134 N.E. 796, 799 (Mass. 1922); Jackson
v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 555 (1867). But see Elias Clark, The Limitation on
Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 447-48
(1960) (discussing Jackson and similar cases and deeming them a dead letter nearly
half a century ago).
133 See, e.g., Register of Wills for Baltimore City v. Cook, 216 A.2d 542, 549 (Md.
1966).
134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. 1 (2003); Laura Brown Chisolm,
Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308,
345-47 (1990).
135 See, e.g., In reWestboro Baptist Church, 189 P.3d 535, 554 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that "our Supreme Court has determined that political action or activities are
not considered a religious activity" in affirming a denial of tax exemption for personal
property owned by a religious group, but used for political purposes); see also, e.g.,
New England Legal Found. v. City of Bos., 670 N.E.2d 152, 158-59 n.8 (Mass. 1996)
(asserting that state law precludes tax exemption for organizations at some level of
political activity); Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Twp. of Lansing, 378 N.W.2d
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A significant body of law expresses distaste for political activity by
charities. Federal tax law imposes severe limitations based on it,
though routes exist for some charities to partially avoid these
restraints. State law is more equivocal. Engaging in politics will rarely
block access to formation as a charity under state law. Still, property
tax exemption may be threatened by such activities, and the overall
concern about these activities somehow corrupting charities remains
clear. Again, one might take from this reading the idea that eschew-
ing politics is essential to protect charitable mission. Even without
comprehensive and consistent prohibitions, charities have received
the message that they should eschew politics. That message is loud
and clear, and it chills charities' enthusiasm for engaging even in per-
mitted political activities. 136 Yet, it remains debatable whether charity
law needs to direct charities to avoid politics in order to safeguard the
mission imperative.
The law directing charities to avoid politics seems inextricably
tied to a quite cynical view of the political system as flawed and some-
what sinister. The fear here is that a charity that becomes enmeshed
in politics, or does so to a significant degree, will be captured by its
political patrons, to the detriment of its charitable mission.137 Alter-
natively, of course, a charity might reasonably remain above the fray
and yet see lobbying, appealing to the public to engage with the politi-
cal system, or campaigning for candidates as vital components of pur-
suing its charitable mission. Regardless, current charity law warns
charities to abstain from or limit political involvement, lest their lead-
ers be diverted, their reputations sullied, or both.
Legal requirements limiting or prohibiting charities' involvement
in political activity have been linked to other goals, of course. Perhaps
the most common explanation for restricting charities' political activ-
ity is that government needs to remain neutral in the benefits it pro-
737, 743 n.6 (Mich. 1985) ("[C]ertain forms of lobbying may preclude a tax
exemption.").
136 See, e.g., Mark Chaves et al., Does Government Funding Suppress Nonprofits'Political
Activity?, 69 AM. Soc. REv. 292, 297 (2004); Clark, supra note 132, at 452-54. Of
course, not all charities are intimidated by these prohibitions, and some engage in
prohibited activities regardless or in protest. See Eric Kelderman, Churches Protest Poli-
ticking Ban, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 16, 2008, at 13 (describing coordinated effort
in 2008 presidential election).
137 See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous
for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1337-39 (2007); see also Buck-
les, Peep, supra note 13, at 1085-91 (describing this view critically); Laura B. Chisolm,
Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 248
(1988) (same).
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vides to charities. 38  This neutrality argument, however, is
undermined by the ability of charities to engage in limited political
activities and by government's apparent willingness to forego neutral-
ity when granting businesses deductions for political activity. 139 Some
have also raised concerns that expanding these benefits to politically
active charities would generate an intolerable loss in tax revenue.
140
This argument posits that a concern for the diversion of government
resources, and by extension taxpayer dollars, is the problem with char-
ities' political activity, rather than the diversion of charity leaders.'
4 '
The argument, though, eventually leads back to concerns about chari-
table mission. If political activity is an appropriate action for charities,
as relevant to their programs to feed the hungry, put on cultural
events, or improve neighborhood relations, one should not worry that
government resources are being expended on these activities.
Indeed, the tax benefits for charities are intended to recognize the
value of these contributions to society.
The political nature of lobbying and electioneering activities do
not inherently pose risks to mission accountability. Political activities
raise mission concerns when they lead charities to pursue purely pri-
vate purposes or magnify the power of individuals within charities,
while screening them from observation and regulation.1 42 Rather
than attempting to determine whether charities have veered off
course in such damaging ways, however, current charity law uses
broad political restrictions as a slapdash proxy.
138 See Buckles, Community Interest Theory, supra note 13, at 1079-85; Chisolm,
supra note 134, at 249-52; Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking
the Internal Revenue Code's Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1269,
1286-1314 (1993).
139 See Chisolm, supra note 134, at 250-52; Galston, supra note 138, at 1286-1314.
140 See Clark, supra note 132, at 460-61. Another recent justification for the politi-
cal restrictions explains them as necessary due to its vision of the charitable sector as
the government's competitor. See Brian D. Galle, Foundation or Empire? The Role of
Charity in a Federal System 58-61 (Jan. 5, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473107.
141 See Clark, supra note 132, at 460-61.
142 See Buckles, Peep, supra note 13, at 1085-89; Mayer, supra note 1, at 34; see also
David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption-Beyond Efficiency,
Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 Prrr. TAX REV. 1, 17 (2006) (arguing
the purpose of tax law's political limitations, inter alia, is to "mediate between the
private individual tendency for authoritative control and the public interests
advanced by the charitable entity").
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The purpose of charity law is to focus charities and their leaders
on the mission imperative. Current charity law partially, but not opti-
mally, pursues this goal. It does forcefully demand that charities
maintain an other-regarding orientation. Self-regarding activity,
which uses the charity to provide benefits to its leaders or other pri-
vate individuals outside the class benefitted by its charitable mission,
should continue to disqualify an entity from charitable status. In con-
trast, current charity law demonstrates only a weak commitment to
group governance. A charity must be composed of and governed by a
diverse group, rather than by a single individual, in order to provide a
means for monitoring and evolving charitable mission. Therefore,
charity law should be revised to more consistently embrace a strong
group governance norm. Current charity law's attempts to define and
limit charities' commercial and political activity at best operate as
messy proxies for mission enforcement. These activities are not inher-
ently destructive of mission, and chilling them may damage charities'
autonomy and vitality. Thus, the commercial and political restrictions
are ripe for relaxation or removal.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE ESSENTIALS
The constraints created by current charity law attempt to train
the eyes of charity leaders on their missions. As with any constraint,
however, they also impose real costs. They limit possible innovations
in charity financing, working methods, and governance. Charity inno-
vators are bumping up against these constraints, and challenging
them in creative and interesting ways. Many of these challenges
derive from the increasing trend toward blending charitable motiva-
tions with business methods. This Part will offer a series of examples
of this sector-blending activity, suggest how these phenomena chal-
lenge current charity law, and address how charity law should respond
to them. This review reinforces the notion that charity law embodying
the other-regarding orientation requirement remains crucial and that
charity law expressing the group governance requirement should be
amplified. It also offers further support for easing the restrictions on
charities' commercial and political activities.
A. Self-Regarding Charity
Several recent proposals and innovations would permit self-
regarding behavior by charities. In one such ambitious proposal, Dan
Palotta calls for a new model for charities to operate with a profit-
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distribution motivation.1 43 Charities should be permitted to raise cap-
ital by promising investors a financial return. 14 4 Palotta argues his
reform will help charities raise crucial funding, beyond what dona-
tions, loans, and fees for services can provide. 145 First off, he argues,
these existing sources simply do not provide enough total financing to
fund the projects that the charitable sector can and should put for-
ward. 146 Second, in his view, these funding sources come with inher-
ent limitations on their use. 147 Donors tend to want their investments
to be used to create programs immediately or to be placed in an
endowment and left untouched. 148 Bank loans and tax-exempt bond
financing are options, but loan officers will require collateral and will
not lend to charities in order to support innovative new programs.
1 49
Fees for service are not available to all charities, by any means; they
are a feasible source of income only to those charities who serve rela-
tively wealthy beneficiaries with the ability to pay.150 Investment capi-
tal, on the other hand, is a huge untapped resource charities can use
to pursue innovation and take risks, limited only by what the market is
willing to fund.15 1 Thus, Palotta argues equity capital can be used to
fund innovation and risk-taking activities in a way that other sources of
charity capital cannot.
1 52
Today, of course, charity law's other-regarding orientation
requirement blocks this financing resource. Palotta argues this
restriction should be removed to allow charities to seek equity inves-
tors and pay them for access to their capital.'5 3 In the absence of such
changes (or until they happen), he suggests that entrepreneurs with
charitable missions legally form their organizations as for-profit corpo-
rations to avoid these restrictions-as he did.'
54
143 See DAN PALOTTA, UNCHARITABLE 17 (2008).
144 See id. at 116-25. This proposal is part of Palotta's broader agenda of reform.
Other items include expanding the magnitude and types of compensation nonprofits
may pay, encouraging them to take greater risks and look to the long term, and
encouraging them to engage in paid advertising. See id. at 47-116.
145 See id. at 117-18.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 118-20.
148 See id.
149 See id. at 122-24.
150 See id. at 120-23.
151 See id. at 121.
152 See id. at 123-24.




Where Palotta reasons from experience, law professors Anup
Malani and Eric Posner use economic analysis. 155 They, too, contest
the need to restrict charities from utilizing equity capital. In a chal-
lenge to federal tax law's expression of the other-regarding orienta-
tion requirement, they argue that the right to tax exemption should
be uncoupled from the nonprofit form and its nondistribution con-
straint. 156 Rather, when for-profit entities engage in socially beneficial
activities, they too should be eligible for tax benefits currently
reserved only for nonprofit charities. 157 Malani and Posner take issue
with various arguments that might justify coupling. They argue that if
tax subsidies are useful to augment the production of public goods,
these subsidies should be made available to any entity that produces
public goods, regardless of their nonprofit or for-profit form. 158 Like-
wise, they argue that the nondistribution constraint is not necessary to
solve the agency problems that arise in producing charitable goods or
services, and assert that it will often be ineffective in doing so. 15 9 Fur-
ther, Malani and Posner claim that, at least outside the case of true
public goods, encouraging altruists to produce charitable goods and
services will often result in inefficient overproduction. 160  Finding
each of these justifications wanting, they argue that any government
subsidization of community benefit activities available to nonprofits
should be made equally available to subsidize such activities by for-
profits.161
155 See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REv.
2017 (2007).
156 See id. at 2064-65.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 2029-31.
159 See id. at 2031-39.
160 See id. at 2042-50. The authors also dispatch with the idea that coupling pro-
tects consumers suffering from inadequate information about the producers of chari-
table goods or avoids the administrative burden that policing tax benefits of for-
profits would create for the IRS. See id. at 2050-54. They suggest that enforcement of
consumer protection laws should be sufficient to deal with the former problem and
user fees could offset the impact of the latter. See id.
161 Of course, these ideas have not gone without challenge. Victor Fleischer noted
the significant regulatory challenges involved in executing Malani and Posner's pro-
posal. See Victor Fleischer, "For Profit Charity" Not Quite Ready for Prime Time, 93 VA. L.
REv. IN BRIEF 231, 232 (2008), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2008/O1/
21/fleischer.pdf. Brian Galle argues "If]or-profit charity threatens to shift costs to
charities, weaken the warm glow of giving, distort managerial incentives, and diminish
or confuse donor choice." Galle, supra note 14, at 1233. Usha Rodrigues argues for-
profit firms cannot offer the same identity benefits to their patrons as can nonprofits.
See Rodrigues, supra note 17, manuscript at 35.
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These proposals do not exist solely in the realm of theory. Even
without the carrot of tax breaks, Google Inc. took up the idea of pur-
suing charitable endeavors by for-profit means. It formed Google.org,
the philanthropic arm to which it devoted one percent of the com-
pany's equity and profits, as a division of for-profit Google Inc.'
62
Although the company originally founded a traditional nonprofit, tax-
exempt foundation to pursue its philanthropic vision, it soon found
charity law's restrictions on this mode of operations too con-
straining.' 63 It moved its philanthropy in-house, within its profit-gen-
erating and profit-distributing public company. As such, Google.org
then began directly investing in companies and projects in line with
its conservation, public health, and poverty reduction mission.
164 If
these investments generate returns, the returns would go to Google
itself and would be, at least in theory, available for distribution to the
company's shareholders. 165 However, even Google.org's founders do
not appear to support a complete reversal in the commitment to the
other-regarding orientation requirement. While its for-profit philan-
thropy model would permit equity returns from its charitable activi-
ties, Google.org leaders fervently claimed that any such gains would
For an economics-driven challenge to the authors' theoretical claims, see James
R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MIcH. L.
REv. 1179 (2010). The authors argue that additional tax benefits will create incen-
tives for for-profits to enter or increase their presence in industries populated by non-
profits. For-profits will crowd out nonprofits as they enter mixed industries and cause
the behavior of nonprofits to shift away from their other-regarding missions. See id. at
1199-1203. The authors also point out that it may be unnecessary to extend tax bene-
fits for the community benefit activities undertaken by for-profits, as losses in profit-
ability as a result of these activities will be accompanied by equivalent decreases in tax
liability, and that Malani and Posner's proposal will create opportunities for tax arbi-
trage that will be difficult to police. See id. at 1213-15.
162 See What Is Google.org?, GOOGLE.ORG, http://www.google.org/about.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2011).
163 See id.; see also Sheryl Sandberg, About Google.org, GOOGLE.ORG BLOG (Oct. 11,
2005, 9:02 PM), http://googeblog.blogspot.com/2005/10/about-googleorg.html
(stating that Google does not "expect to make further donations to the Foundation
for the foreseeable future"). At the time it was launched, Google.org leader Larry
Brilliant explained "Google.org can play the entire keyboard, it can start companies,
build industries, pay consultants, lobby, give money to individuals and make a profit."
See Stephanie Strom & Miguel Helft, Google Finds It Hard to Reinvent Philanthropy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at BU1 (quoting from an earlier New York Times interview).
164 See What Is Google.org?, supra note 162.
165 See Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. RExV. 2437,
2466-67 (2008); Fishman, supra note 24, at 607.
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only be reinvested in future philanthropy. 166 Today, Google.org has
shifted its focus yet again. Now it concentrates on engineering
projects that use Google Inc. resources to achieve social goals.
167
While Google.org continues to evolve, its development demonstrates
the frustration of charity innovators with the limitations of charity law,
and how they are seeking to escape them.
Although the founders of social enterprises generally do not seek
charity status, reasoning like Palotta's or Malani and Posner's could
also bring these organizations within the charity fold. These compa-
nies gauge their success by two metrics-earning profits for owners
and achieving some measure of social or community benefit, perhaps
doing the former to enable the latter. 168 Current charity law rejects a
double-bottom line approach to charity due to the taint of profit dis-
tribution. These enterprises are unable to form as nonprofit corpora-
tions or charitable trusts; they cannot obtain federal or state tax
exemption. By distributing profits to shareholders or other owners,
social enterprises clearly breach the nondistribution constraint and
pursue self-regarding objectives. Yet, the founders of these entities
tout their combination of other-regarding and self-regarding objec-
tives as their hallmark. 69 When an entity and its owners can "do well
by doing good," they see a strong hand forcing entities classed as char-
itable to pursue charity alone as short-sighted.
170
Legislative innovations also figure here. Since 2008, seven U.S.
states have enacted legislation authorizing the low-profit limited liabil-
166 See Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google's Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2006, at Al; Harriet Rubin, Google's Searches Now Include Ways to Make a Better World,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, at Cl.
167 See Strom & Helft, supra note 163 (describing this change of focus and com-
menting that now Google.org's "hyperbole looks more like hubris"); What Is
Google.org?, supra note 162; see also Larry Brilliant, The Next Chapter for Google.org,
GOOGLE.ORG BLOG (Feb. 23, 2009, 4:17 PM), http://blog.google.org/2009/02/
next-chapter-for-googleorg.html (describing shift in focus).
168 SeeJ. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, in SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1, 2 (Marilyn L. Kourilsky & William B. Salstad eds., 2003) (refer-
ring to these entities as "for-profit social ventures").
169 See Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REv.
337, 339 (2009); see also, e.g., Marci Alboher, A Social Solution, Without Going the Non-
profit Route, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at B5 (quoting one social enterprise founder's
position that "[w]e could have done it as a nonprofit over a hundred years, but if we
wanted to do it in five or 10 years, then we believed it needed to be fueled by profit");
Steve Lohr, A Capitalist Jolt for Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at B1 (quoting
another founder saying his company "needs to be a large business to have a really
significant social impact .... We couldn't do what we're doing as a nonprofit.").
170 SeeJOHN ELKINCTON & PAMELA HARTIGAN, THE POWER OF UNREASONABLE PEO-
PLE 117-20 (2008).
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ity company (L3C) form hybridizing for-profit and nonprofit ele-
ments.1 71 The L3C tweaks the LLC form of organization. An L3C is
formed to pursue traditionally charitable activities, but also contem-
plates making some, albeit likely low, profit.1 72 The L3C enabling leg-
islation prohibits income production from being a "significant
purpose of the company ... provided, however that the fact that a
person produces significant income or capital appreciation shall not,
in the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence [that income
production is] a significant purpose."1 73
Individuals or entities may be members of an L3C with rights in
governance and to distributions. 174 Any rights to distributions and
the distributions themselves, however, need not be identical across
members. 175 This flexibility would enable some L3C members to con-
tribute capital to the entity as investors, entitling them to a share in
the entities' midstream or residual profits. 176 Such investors might
seek a market-rate return or a lower one, combined with the opportu-
nity to make social or psychic gains from a socially responsible invest-
ment. Other L3C members could contribute capital in a transaction
financially akin to a donation, making contributions with no intent to
receive a financial return. 177 Indeed, the explicit goal of this legisla-
tion is to provide an organizational form that will signal to founda-
tions that an entity is an appropriate recipient of program-related
171 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 619, 620 (2010); Ann Meyer, Firms with Social Bent See Payoff in New Law,
CHI. TRiB., Aug. 10, 2009, at 19 (noting Illinois's enactment of L3C legislation);
Nicole Wallace, Tough Economy Offers New Opportunities for Charity-Run Businesses,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 7, 2009, at 33 (describing Michigan, Wyoming, Utah, and
the Crow nation's adoption of legislation recognizing the L3C); Laws, AM. FOR COM-
MUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.php (last
visited Mar. 14, 2011) (listing Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, Vermont, and the
.Oglala Sioux nation as additional jurisdictions that have adopted L3C legislation);
Legislative Watch, AM. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcommunity
development.org/legislativewatch.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) (listing twenty addi-
tional states considering L3C legislation). See generally Kelley, supra note 169, at
353-76 (reviewing efforts to create hybrid legal entities and noting the particular
promise of the L3C).
172 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(i) (1997).
173 See id. § 3001 (27) (B).
174 See Hines, Jr. et al., supra note 161, at 1189.
175 See Robert Lang, Americans for Community Development L3C Overview, AM. FOR
COMMUNITY DEv., 3-4, http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/supporting
downloads/ACDOverview.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
176 See id. at 3.
177 See id. at 4.
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investments 178 for which contemplation of a return as a motive is spe-
cifically barred.1 79 The pass-through nature of federal taxation of
LLCs means that an L3C entity itself will not be taxed; individual
members' earnings will be taxed according to their independent tax
status. 180 By permitting both donor-type and investor-type members,
the L3C form explicitly melds other-regarding and self-regarding
modes of operation.
18 '
Across the Atlantic, another hybrid form of organization poses
challenges to the other-regarding orientation requirement. The com-
munity interest company (CIC) is an entity formed under U.K. com-
pany law, and may be either limited by shares (similar to our for-profit
conception) or limited by guarantee (similar to our nonprofit concep-
tion).18 2 However, CICs have several important characteristics that
differentiate them from typical U.K. companies. A CIC must pass a
community interest test, showing "that its purposes could be regarded
by a reasonable person as being in the community or wider public
interest"18 3 and it must report on its community interest achievements
annually.18 4 A CIC must also "confirm that access to the benefits it
provides will not be confined to an unduly restricted group."'8 5 When
a CIC is limited by shares, it may have share owners entitled to divi-
dends, though these dividends are subject to a cap. Moreover, share
owners will not share in the residual profits on winding up of the com-
pany. A CIC's assets are subject to an "asset lock" whereby on dissolu-"
tion all assets must go to a charity or another CIC.186 All of this is
overseen by a dedicated CIC regulator.
178 See id. at 2; see also John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having "Two
Masters": A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability 4-7 (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author).
179 See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006) (mandating that "no significant purpose" of a pro-
gram-related investment "is the production of income or the appreciation of prop-
erty"). Qualified program-related investments count toward a private foundation's
five percent annual payout requirement.
180 See Lang, supra note 175, at 2.
181 One proposed use of the L3C vehicle would employ tranches of members,
each with a different combination of financial and governance rights. See id.
182 See REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST Cos., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4 (Oct.
2009) [hereinafter CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS], available at http://www.
cicregulator.gov.uk/ClCleaflets/FAQ%20%200ctober%202009%20V5.00%2OFinal.
pdf.
183 See id. at 8.
184 See id. at 11.
185 See id. at 8.
186 See id. at 9.
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In the CIC, again, other-regarding and self-regarding modes are
intentionally blended. On the one hand, the CIC must provide its
benefits to some relatively large class and some core of a CIC's assets
must be irrevocably dedicated to community interest or charitable
purposes.1 87 On the other hand, the CIC entails a kind of equity
investment where the shareholders are permitted to engage in profit-
taking. Investors may purchase shares in a CIC, shares that entitle
them to capped dividends that will vary depending upon the entity's
profits, though not to residual earnings on dissolution. Thus, the CIC
offers observers an alternative model for hybridization and weakening
of the other-regarding orientation requirement, 188 though one that
the U.K. has deemed to fall outside the charity category.
189
The B Corporation initiative also attempts to create a hybrid
brand for enterprises blending self- and other-regarding modes of
operation, but until recently without a legislative imprimatur. A "B"
or "for-benefit" corporation incorporates under traditional state for-
profit corporation law, but commits itself to "use[ ] the power of busi-
ness to solve social and environmental problems."190 B corporations
solemnize this commitment by adopting language in their governing
documents instructing their directors to consider the interests of
employees, suppliers, customers, the community, and society at large
in carrying out their duties.191 Further, before an entity may use the
"B" designation, it must be vetted by B Lab, a third-party certification
entity that controls the trademark.192 This combination of self-regula-
tion and a private contracting and certification system has not yet
been fully tested, but it provides a framework for institutionalizing
and standardizing a form blending self-regarding and other-regarding
187 See id. at 4-5. These requirements are intentionally broader than U.K. law's
definition of charity. In fact, CICs expressly fall outside the United Kingdom's chari-
table category, and existing charities converting to CIC form will lose charity status.
See id.
188 See Oonagh Breen, Holding the Line: Regulatory Challenges in Ireland and
England when Business and Charity Collide 22 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished conference
draft) (on file with author) (describing the CIC as "a halfway house between a fully
commercial enterprise and a charity").
189 See Companies (Audit, Investigation and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004,
§ 26(3)(a) (U.K.).
190 Introducing the B Corporation, CERTIFIED B CoRP., 3 (2009), http://www.
bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/2009%20B%2OCorp-Intro-Package.
pdf.
191 See Legal Framework, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/
become/legal (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
192 See About Certified B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/
about (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
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behavior. In addition, Maryland adopted enabling legislation for a
statutory "benefit corporation" modeled on B Lab's concept in April
2010, and several other states have followed suit.193 This state-sanc-
tioned corporate form will be available to entities vetted by private
certification systems, which include B Lab's and potentially those of
other entrants to the market.
Some commentators see these and other developments as suffi-
ciently scalable that they predict a potential market for charity.
194
The over $150 billion market for socially responsible investments sug-
gests that at least some segment of consumers are interested in invest-
ing funds in entities that blend the desire for profits with the desire
for social good.195 Experiments with charitable or social "initial pub-
lic offerings" (IPOs) further demonstrate the growing cache attached
to challenging the other-regarding orientation requirement. 196 These
efforts purport to sell ownership and use the trappings of an IPO, but
in fact offer investment units that are economically indistinguishable
from donations, with no profit-sharing element.1 97 Of course, these
IPOs are in reality little more than marketing ploys, but initiating
charities believe the message of ownership will be salient enough to
publicize it. This belief is quite astounding if one believes in the unas-
sailability of other-regarding orientation.
Developments blending charity and business challenge the wis-
dom of charity law's other-regarding orientation requirement, its
strongest and most fundamental policy prescription. Commentators
question its utility. Innovators sidestep it by forming entities as for-
profits, and pursuing hybrid forms through legislation or otherwise.
Even some traditional charities have taken on programs that may sug-
gest comfort with relaxing the other-regarding essential. Although
these challenges to the other-regarding orientation requirement offer
193 See 2010 Md. Laws 97; see also Diane Mastrull, Maryland Adopts New Socially
Aware Corporation Law, PHILA. INQ., Apr. 15, 2010, at C01 (describing the new law and
noting its October 2010 effective date). For a review of the statutory benefit corpora-
tion organizational form, see Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations-A Sustainable
Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
194 See, e.g., PALOTrA, supra note 143, at 121; Kelley, supra note 169, at 360-62;
Lang, supra note 175, at 4-7.
195 See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 60 (2005) (reporting that in 2003,
$151 billion was under management with investment funds that screen companies for
social impact); Jim Brown, Equity Finance for Social Enterprises, 2 Soc. ENTERPRISE J. 73,
74-75 (2006) (providing anecdotal information on the demand for "ethical
investment").
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valuable insights on charities and charity law, they should ultimately
be rebuffed.
The other-regarding orientation requirement is core to enforcing
the mission imperative of charity law. For fiduciaries and members,
the law expressing this essential serves as a useful prophylactic. Deter-
mining mission and the appropriate way to pursue it is a challenge for
every charity and its constituents. But, the other-regarding orienta-
tion requirement warns a director, officer, or member away from
attempting to serve two masters-one of whom is herself. This adds at
least some boundaries to notoriously muddy decisionmaking. While
charities are and should be given great autonomy in selecting the
means by which their sundry charitable missions are met, the mission
imperative is what gives the charitable category its utility for society
and for its stakeholders. The other-regarding essential plays a vital
reinforcing role in mission accountability, to which already stretched
external enforcement mechanisms will rarely and should rarely
address their efforts.
The other-regarding essential also helpfully delineates the charity
category for other major charity stakeholders. Charity law defines
those entities solely devoted to achieving a charitable mission, staking
them out as safe places for donors and the public to send their contri-
butions and tax dollars without concern that they will someday be
diverted to private ends. Of course, donors will never obtain com-
plete assurance that their particular charitable goals will continue to
be met by charities, which can go in and out of existence and change
their purposes over time (sometimes with and sometimes without reg-
ulatory supervision). 19 Yet, charity stakeholders rely on the legal
prohibitions of self-regarding behavior to provide some minimal
assurance of a charity's enduring mission to benefit society, which the
available enforcement architecture will have some reasonable ability
to police. The Palotta and Malani/Posner proposals should therefore
be resisted. Equity share ownership of charities should not be permit-
ted, nor should for-profit entities be admitted to the status of charity.
The other-regarding essential should be maintained and conspicu-
ously enforced.
Yet, there are important lessons to be learned from recent chari-
table innovations, particularly their forceful demonstration that chari-
table activities and purposes are not and should not be the sole
purview of charities. Again, the key distinction is between being a
charity and being an entity that engages in charitable activities or has,
among others, charitable purposes. For-profit or mixed entities make
198 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 45, at 226-30.
[VOL. 86: 1
CHARITY LAW'S ESSENTIALS
valuable contributions to society, for which they should be lauded.
Moreover, clinging to the other-regarding orientation requirement
will necessarily limit the types and quantity of charity funding availa-
ble. Broadening the range of entities empowered and encouraged to
engage in charitable activities may provide access to additional reve-
nue streams to fund these activities. New and distinct tax or other
benefits may even be warranted to further encourage noncharities to
undertake charitable activities and to blend their self-regarding pur-
poses with their other-regarding ones.
B. Singular Charity
As noted, the group governance requirement is only weakly
expressed in current charity law. 199 Incorporated charities generally
must be run by boards and those organized as unincorporated associa-
tions must have members. Yet, a voting membership is optional for
incorporated charities and many practitioners recommend structur-
ing charities without voting members precisely to avoid the complica-
tions and complexity created by group operation. 200 More shockingly,
charities taking the trust form may be governed by a single trustee,
201
and this course too has its advocates in practice. Charity law should
be reformed to take better account of the critical role group govern-
ance plays in enforcing mission accountability. A single individual's
vision of the good is insufficient to merit treatment and favor as a
charity. While not every group needs to have members and be demo-
cratically governed, a strong group governance model is vital to
encourage the dialogic process of evaluating and evolving mission.
The idea that charitable mission will be something identified by a
group and legitimately evolved by it is fundamental to enforcing the
mission imperative.
Charity law should prohibit single director incorporated charities
and single trustee charitable trusts. 20 2 The most expedient route to
this reform would simply add a group governance requirement to fed-
eral tax exemption law. Those concerned about federalization of
charity law, however, would likely prefer to bar these structures under
199 See supra Part I.B; see also Silber, supra note 47, 72-86 (describing a trend away
from consultation in governance both in nonprofit law and practice).
200 See FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 19, at 159.
201 See Brody, supra note 48, at 645.
202 To be clear, I suggest mandatory reform of entities currently structured with a
single director or trustee, not dismantling them and certainly not forfeiting their
assets away from the charitable stream.
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each state's relevant organizational laws.20 3 If this reform could be
universally accomplished, federal and state tax law's reliance on state
organizational form as a predicate for exemption would bring all rele-
vant sources into alignment with a strong group governance norm.
204
Jurisdictional variation on the number of fiduciaries a charity
requires, on the other hand, would likely lead to forum shopping.
At whatever level of government this reform is pursued, it will be
more politically difficult to prohibit single trustee charitable trusts
than single director charitable corporations. Single trustee trusts are
used to speed formation, entrench donor control, and limit evolution
of charitable purpose. Speeding formation is an understandable and
reasonable goal; worthy charitable missions can arise in an instant and
there must be a way to address them swiftly. However, the corporate
form can be very speedily acquired in many states.20 5 States with slow
corporate registration facilities should speed them up for indepen-
dent reasons. Even when a trust is the only option for speedy crea-
tion, finding two additional trustees to meet a three-trustee
requirement should not impose too great a burden.
The other reasons to use a single-trustee trust, entrenching donor
control, and limiting evolution of charitable purpose, are not likewise
appropriate aims for charities. When a donor makes a donation to a
charity with perpetual life, the donor does and should lose control to
the entity charged by society to pursue the charitable mission defined
by its documents and as legitimately evolved over time.20 6 The group
governance essential stands in opposition to the idea that this mission
may be bound to the views of a single person. The group it envisions
is important precisely because of the need for charities to evolve their
missions, and thus enforces the mission imperative.
Of course, mandating that charities be governed by more than a
single individual will not suffice to guarantee strong group govern-
ance. 20 7 Directors may lack sophistication about matters brought to
their attention. Even highly motivated and sophisticated directors will
203 See Brody, supra note 48, at 683-84; see also Fishman, supra note 70, at 578-91
(noting federalism problems with pursuing governance aims through federal tax
exemption law).
204 The same jurisdictional choice dynamic applies to the other group governance
reforms I advocate here, though I will not repeat it with respect to each proposal.
205 See FREMONT-SMTH, supra note 19, at 152.
206 SeeJohn F. Coverdale, Legislating in the Dark: How Congress Regulates Tax-Exempt
Organizations in Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 809, 812 (2010).
207 Of course, group decisionmaking can be slow and indecisive. These unavoida-




suffer from serious information deficits relative to charities' managers
and employees. 20  This information asymmetry, relevant personali-
ties, or both may also lead to domination by a charity's executive
director or CEO. Finally, simple group dynamics may lead to
groupthink and its accompanying risks of stagnation and suboptimal
decisions.20 9 Each of these potential problems threatens the ability of
a governing body to operate as a truly dialogic structure. Fortunately,
multiple legal innovations can be used to strengthen boards' ability to
embody more than merely formal group governance.
First, charity law's commitment to group governance should be
shored up by strengthening its commitment to fiduciary indepen-
dence and board diversity. A board with a majority of related or finan-
cially interested members may nominally utilize group governance,
but the group members can be too easily dominated and therefore
unable to serve the purpose of promoting dialogue on issues of mis-
sion. To avoid these situations where group governance is seriously
undermined, independence requirements should demand that
boards be composed of a majority of unrelated and financially uncon-
flicted directors.210 To make greater strides toward achieving board
diversity stimulating real dialogue, independence requirements could
alternatively limit the percentage of directors with specific kinds of
relationships with or interests in the charity. Such a requirement
might require and limit board service by donors and beneficiaries, in
addition to those with financial or familial relationships with the char-
ity. This more sweeping type of requirement would have to target a
percentage of directors large enough to be relevant in board discus-
sions and building coalitions, but small enough to avoid screening out
too many categories of qualified and interested board candidates.
2 11
Of course, best practice guides, self-regulatory programs, training
efforts, and practitioner advice should also encourage charities to con-
sider independence and diversity when screening fiduciary candi-
dates, as a complement to statutory mandates.
Fiduciary law itself should also more clearly articulate charity
fiduciaries' responsibility to act within an operational group. The law
regulating incorporated charities nods to this concept with structural
208 See Elizabeth Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform: Indepen-
dence or Democracy ?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1, 23-25.
209 See Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit Govern-
ance, 52 FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-
1477553.
210 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 62, at 829-30.
211 See id. at 829-31.
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requirements like quorum and voting rules. 212 Commentators con-
cerned about charity boards' frailties have proposed reforming fiduci-
ary law to better reveal or limit charity fiduciaries' private interests as
they pursue their directorial roles, 213 or to focus them more actively
on pursuit of charity mission. 214 The proposed ALI Principles of the
Law of Nonprofit Organizations "endorse [s], for all charities, the trust
law's imposition of an obligation of cooperation on cofiduciaries." 215
These reforms could nicely coexist with a structural commitment that
part of a charity fiduciary's obligation is to function within and main-
tain the vitality of a governing group.
Finally, charity law could mandate voting membership structures
in incorporated charities. Although voting membership structures
employing a sole corporate member likely will not meet a strong ideal
of group governance, a legal mandate that incorporated charities
empower a pool of individual voting members would forcefully
embrace the group governance norm. While I support measures
encouraging the use of voting members, I do not recommend man-
dating their use. Charities often opt not to use voting members
because of the practical difficulty of attracting individual members,
tracking them over time, and obtaining sufficient participation by
them to achieve a quorum for necessary corporate decisions.
216
Amending nonprofit corporate statutes to require all incorporated
charities to empower members to elect directors would likely stimu-
late a wave of charity transformations into trust form, or simply result
in directors being named members as well.21 7 Neither of these effects
would cause charities to be more accountable to their missions. Char-
ity law should encourage the use of voting members, but this is a place
where charity law may be able to do only so much. Many other forces
are at work in shaping charities' operation, keeping them relevant
and vital. Practitioners, as well as those authoring best practice guides
212 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 19, at 220.
213 See Melanie B. Leslie, Conflicts of Interest and Nonprofit Governance: The Challenge
of Groupthink, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 551, 569 (2010) (recommending a flat prohibition
on charity fiduciary self-dealing or, alternatively, requiring disclosure of conflicts,
investigation of alternatives, and proof that self-dealing transactions offer below-mar-
ket pricing in order to counter the perils of groupthink).
214 See Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming
Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FoRDtA L. REv. 893, 921-22 (2007) (arguing charity fiducia-
ries owe a duty of fidelity to charitable mission).
215 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 320 cmt. a(2) (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 2007).
216 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Internally




and training materials should promote the use of democratic govern-
ance structures, 218 as well as the development of other means to pro-
mote dialogue about organizational mission.
219
Reinforcing charity law's commitment to group governance will
guide its response to developments like for-profit philanthropy and
social enterprise. If unincorporated for-profit forms could be used to
create charities, the group essential would be seriously undermined.
The most obvious challenge is the sole proprietorship, which is a form
currently available to businesses but not to charities, and which is per-
vasive throughout the for-profit sector.220 The sole proprietorship
would offer a charitable innovator the greatest control, in fact the abil-
ity to create a singular charity. The partnership form sets group gov-
ernance as its default model, whereby all partners have equal rights to
participate in management. 221 However, the group may be as small as
two, and the defaults may be changed significantly. 222 The enabling
nature of partnership statutes also allows founders to retain considera-
ble control through agreements and variations in governance struc-
ture.2 23  They may retain management rights and limit the
governance rights of new partners to a substantial degree. In an LLC,
the level of commitment to group governance may depend on
whether a member- or manager-managed structure is employed.
224
Still, if any of these unincorporated for-profit forms become permissi-
ble methods of organizing a charity, their inherent flexibility would
undercut the group governance norm.
Serious, though somewhat different, challenges to the group
essential would arise from permitting incorporated for-profit forms
218 See Angela M. Eikenberry, Refusing the Market: A Democratic Discourse for Volun-
tary and Nonprofit Organizations, 38 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 582, 591-92
(2009).
219 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Filling the Gaps in Nonprofit Accountability: Applying the
Club Perspective in the U.S. Legal System, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOs AND NON-
PROFITS 41, 51-61 (Aseem Prakash & Mary Kay Gugerty eds., 2010) (suggesting a role
for self-regulation in stimulating dialogue on charitable mission).
220 See U.S. CENSUS BUmEAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. tbl.722 (2010)
(showing business tax returns from sole proprietorships outnumber corporations and
partnerships by four to ten times).
221 See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e) (amended 1997) ("All partners have equal
rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business.").
222 Id. § 6.
223 See, e.g., id. § 37 (using language such as "unless otherwise agreed").
224 See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 404 (1996) (describing members' rights in man-
agement in each alternative form). See generally Delaware Limited Liability Company
Act, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18 (2005 & West Supp. 2008) (similar); REVISED UNIF.
LTD. LLAB. Co. ACT § 407 (2006) (similar).
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for charities. The details here in part depend on whether the for-
profit corporation is private and closely held or is a publicly held
entity. The corporate architecture of a corporation introduces risks
that nonfounder shareholders may dilute a founder's commitment to
her charitable mission, in favor of instead pursuing profit for them-
selves. The number and proximity of closely held shareholders, how-
ever, may blunt these risks from group governance. Additionally,
founders of close corporations may be able to protect their charitable
mission by aggressively screening potential investors, maintaining a
control position, crafting defensive shareholder agreements, or a com-
bination of these strategies. These are not foolproof tactics, of course,
as even carefully screened new shareholders might deceive founders
or change their minds over time. Shareholder agreements can create
significant limitations on shareholder actions, but can be held invalid
if they restrict transferability unreasonably225 or "clear[ly] conflict
with the governing corporate statute."
2 26
If an incorporated for-profit charity becomes a publicly held cor-
poration, further challenges to the group essential will arise. Bringing
on a broad group of public shareholders creates significant dangers
for a charity and its founders. Common shareholders endowed with
voting powers can obtain board representation, exert veto power on
major transactions, and enable or even engage in takeover action. All
of these means could be used to shift an entity's mission away from
charitable purposes and toward more typical for-profit objectives.
They would do so precisely by using the group governance model
mandated by for-profit corporate law. Again, to protect their position,
founders will likely try to maintain a strong majority or controlling
position.
Founders of a corporation about to seek broad equity investment
may also adopt governance structures to protect its charitable mission.
Again, these structures will enhance founder control at the expense of
empowering a larger and more diverse group in governance. For
example, Google Inc.'s equity structure uses two classes of stock, one
held by founders and one held by ordinary common shareholders.
227
The founders' stock class holds a significant voting advantage. This
structure was established prior to the inception of Google.org, moti-
vated by its founders' desire to maintain their authority despite a
225 SeeJAMEs D. Cox ET AL., COIORATIONS § 14.9, at 374-75 (1997).
226 See id. § 14.5, at 369.
227 See DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GoOGLE STORY 172 (2005).
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move to public share ownership and to stave off takeover threats. 228 It
was made known to shareholders in the stock's initial public offering
and has remained a matter of public notice.229 This two-tier structure
now offers substantial security for the founders' mission, including
their commitment to for-profit philanthropy.230 Yet, it also under-
mines group governance. With incorporated for-profit corporate
models, the law's commitment to group governance becomes a risk to
its founders' charitable motives and founders respond by maintaining
tight control.
231
The advent of social enterprise and for-profit philanthropy makes
it ever more important to appreciate and fill the gaps in charity law's
commitment to group governance. While these entities and concepts
should likely be encouraged, they should not be designated as chari-
ties. There is too much pressure on these entities to entrench control
with founders. Mission accountability requires retaining and enforc-
ing the idea that a charity is a group, not an individual endeavor. This
is fundamentally incompatible with existing for-profit organizational
forms.
The hybrid forms of organization described above express various
levels of commitment to group governance. The charter amendments
required to obtain "B" certification or statutory benefit corporation
status require directors to consider the interests of employers, suppli-
ers, the community, and society in making decisions on behalf of the
corporation. 232 As "B" corporations must incorporate in states with
constituency statutes permitting directors to consider nonshareholder
interests in exercising their duties, such language seems to provide a
safe harbor from fiduciary liability in situations where shareholder
interests are sacrificed for some broader social purpose.233 Still, if a
sufficient number of shareholders change their minds about the "for-
228 See Google Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at
29-30 (Aug. 18, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12887.
76/000119312504142742/dsla.htm.
229 See id.
230 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 165, at 2437, 2467-68.
231 See, e.g., Dees & Anderson, supra note 168, at 17-19; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN.
CoRPs. & ASS'NS § 5-6C-07(A) (1) (LexisNexis 2011) (providing a long list of interests
directors of benefit corporations "shall consider" in directorial decisionmaking).
232 See Legal Framework, supra note 191 (requiring directors to consider the interest
of a wide range of stakeholders, the community, and broader society in determining
actions that will be in the company's best interests).
233 See 1 AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 cmt. 6
(1994) ("[Tlhere is little doubt that [restrictions on the general profit-making objec-
tive] would normally be permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders. Such an
agreement might be embodied in the certificate of incorporation, or not.").
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benefit" approach, or are willing to sell their shares to buyers holding
a different view, these amendments can be undone. 234 Moreover, the
"B" and statutory benefit corporation amendments change only the
standards for director governance; they do not empower shareholders
to do more nor do they bestow governance rights upon a broader
stakeholder group.
23 5
The L3C, structured as it is on an LLC model, envisions a role for
members in some type of group governance, at least as a default. If an
L3C uses a member-managed structure, its members will have the
right to participate in governance. 23 6 A manager-managed model del-
egates power for most management decisions to the manager, but
retains members' governance rights over certain major company deci-
sions as well as empowering them to recall the manager.2 37 Part of
what makes the L3C attractive, however, is the extreme flexibility of its
LLC base when it comes to governance. 23 8 L3C founders concerned
about maintaining the organization's hybrid orientation can use this
flexibility to adopt governance structures providing them with power
and additional safeguards. A manager-managed model, with its lim-
ited role for the larger governing constituency, is the most straightfor-
ward of these. A structure could also be crafted to privilege one class
of members with a role in governance, while disempowering other
member classes, again in the hopes of protecting the entities'
double-bottom line or social enterprise orientation. Available model
234 See Make It Official, CERTIFIED B CoR"., http://www.bcorporation.net/become/
official (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) (explaining continuing commitments to remain a
"B" corporation).
235 See Legal Roadmap, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://survey.bcorporation.net/
become/legal2.php (stating in its recommended bylaw changes that they are not
"intended to create or shall create or grant any right in or for any person or any cause
of action by or for any person") (last visited Jan. 28, 2011); see e.g., MD. CODE ANN.
CoRPs. & Ass'NS § 5-6C-07(B) ("A director of a benefit corporation, in the perform-
ance of duties in that capacity, does not have any duty to a person that is a beneficiary
of the public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation.").
236 See, e.g., Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18
(2005 & Supp. 2008) (providing each member equal rights in managing the LLC and
providing that most matters "be decided by a majority of the members"); REVISED
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT § 407 (2006) (same); UNIF. LTD. LtAB. Co. AcT § 404(a)
(1996) (same).
237 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18; REVIsED UNIF. LTD. LIs. Co. ACT § 407; UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT § 404(b)-(c).
238 See Lang, supra note 175, at 3-4.
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operating agreements demonstrate the allure of designing structures
such to entrench the power and views of founders.
239
The L3C also carries limits on transferability of memberships.
Like in LLCs generally, while memberships may be transferred, gov-
ernance rights do not automatically follow sale and are instead contin-
gent on existing members accepting the transferee.2 40 The impact of
this potential restriction on group governance and its mission-based
goals is uncertain. Locking members into the entity may make them
more interested in engaging in group governance, bolstering it. Yet,
limiting transferability could also curtail the range of potential inves-
tors for the organization and the organization's ability to evolve its
mission over time. It is difficult to measure the impact of the L3C on
group governance yet, as it is so novel. The range of governance
options is now limited only by the creativity of operating agreement
drafters and their ability to obtain investors.
The U.K. CIC goes furthest to enshrine group governance in a
hybrid form. CICs are required to have members, who will be share
owners in a CIC limited by shares.241 Yet, the CIC regulator also
directs CICs to include a broad range of additional stakeholders in
governance. 242 Recognizing that different techniques will succeed in
different CIC types and sizes, the regulator does not demand a spe-
cific form of stakeholder involvement. Rather, it offers various sugges-
tions of how the mandate to include stakeholders in governance
might be achieved and requires CICs to report on their efforts to do
so in their annual community interest report.243 Its guidance docu-
ment explains:
The provision of adequate information is clearly the starting
point for the consultation process together with the provision of
easily used methods of feedback.
239 See Legal, AM. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://americansforcommunitydevelop-
ment.org/legal.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) (providing links to model operating
agreements).
240 See Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 18 (2005
& Supp. 2008); REviSED UNIF. LTD. LtA. Co. ACT § 405; UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§§ 502, 503.
241 See REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE NOTES ch.
9, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Chapter%209
%20-%200ctober%202009%20 (version%205%20Final).pdf.
242 See CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 182, at 12.
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This can be achieved by simple methods such as circulating
news letters and holding stakeholder meetings or more sophisti-
cated methods such as setting up a web site with dialogue facilities
or issuing formal consultation documents before taking a major pol-
icy decision. Alternatively, stakeholder groups can be given official
standing under a company's constitution (for example, by requiring
that they are consulted before the directors or members make cer-
tain types of decisions).
Other stakeholders could be included with the members in the
circulation of the company annual report and accounts and invited
to attend an open forum linked to the company's annual general
meeting.
In many organisations the setting up of user and advisory
groups or a club committee separate from the board of directors
can be an effective way of bringing stakeholders into the running of
the organisation.
244
Though they are given freedom to select a method for doing so, the
form compels CICs to bring a greater variety of individuals into the
governance process.
In terms of the group that will actively manage the corporation,
the CIC offers a bit of a mixed bag. CICs organized as private compa-
nies may have only one director; other companies must have two or
more, still not a large group.245 Like "B" corporation directors, CIC
directors must make decisions not only to pursue share owner inter-
ests, but also with the goal of preserving the CIC's ability to meet the
community interest test.246 Thus, founders can perhaps rely on direc-
tors to maintain the entity's social orientation, and share owners will
not be able to discipline CIC directors away from it by making or
threatening fiduciary challenges. Share owners in a CIC may also
have less interest in directing their company away from a social enter-
prise orientation, as they have no right to residual earnings and even
their ability to receive dividends is capped.
Innovations melding business and charity seriously challenge
charity law's commitment to group governance. Permitting charities
to adopt a for-profit framework would threaten complete abandon-
ment of the group essential. In order to protect their control over a
social enterprise vision, for-profit founders will select structures that
approach singular governance. Hybrid forms of organization may
244 See REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., supra note 241, ch. 9, at 5.
245 See CIC FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 182, at 13.





offer opportunities to reassert the group governance norm, and the
forms that have emerged are experimenting with this idea in different
ways. Still, their commitment to group governance is tempered by a
common flexibility as to governance structure. As hybrid forms are
proposed and enacted, attention to group governance is crucial as
charitably minded hybrid enthusiasts may remain understandably
interested in entrenching founder control.
C. Commercial Charity
One need look no further than most the traditional charities to
find challenges to charity law's anticommerciality position. Charities
already engage in substantial levels of commercial activity, and have
done so for quite some time.2 47 The decision to do so is driven at
times simply by the need to make up funding gaps in order to run
their operations. 248 Other times these activities are viewed as meshing
with charitable mission and become an integral part of a charity's pro-
grams. 249 Evidence of the blending of commercial and charitable
activity can also be found in the for-profit arena. Over several
decades, one finds a continuing trend toward proprietary firms offer-
ing traditionally charitable services. 250 The social enterprise move-
ment also exerts pressure on the anticommerciality position.
25 1 If
charity is fundamentally different from commercial enterprise, and
commercial endeavors by charities (and charitable ones by busi-
nesses) should be looked at skeptically, why does this blending appear
so pervasive and so attractive to charities and businesses?
Of course, current charity law does not render all kinds of com-
mercial activity equally suspect. Its suspicion is principally reserved
for commercial activities of questionable relation to charitable mis-
sion.252 The commerciality and UBIT doctrines seize upon the con-
247 See Eleanor Brown & A] Silvinski, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in NON-
PROFIT SECTOR RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 140, 146. See generally To PROFIT
OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 73 (examining the commerciality of nonprofit organi-
zations by industry and over time).
248 See Brown & Silvinski, supra note 247, at 146-47.
249 See id.
250 SeeJoseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steurle, The Changing Economy and the Scope of
Nonprofit-Like Activities, in NONPROFIrS & BUSINESS, supra note 76, at 47, 51 [hereinaf-
ter Cordes & Steurle, Changing Economy]; Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steurle, The
Undivided Self: Are the Business Body and the Nonprofit Soul Separable? 5 (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cordes & Steurle, Body and
Soul].
251 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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tent of commercial as compared with charitable activities, the relative
size of a charity's commercial operations, and the manner of commer-
cial business operation. 25 3 The real impact of the commerciality limi-
tations is thus to skew the choices a charity makes regarding
commercial activity, to ensure the size, content, and manner of com-
mercial activity will conform to charitable mission. While charities
generally are propelled to engage in commercial activities by their
need for additional funding streams, 254 they do not simply engage in
whatever commercial activity appears most likely to earn income.
2 55
Instead, charities choose lines of business that will coalesce with their
mission, make operational choices that will appear to align with it, or
both.256 Further, they use related entities to structure their activities
in ways that will avoid charity law's restrictions and penalties. 257 Chari-
ties skew their commercial activities toward efforts they can defend as
related to avoid commerciality challenges, the UBIT regime, or both.
Parallel to the significant commercial activity charities engage in
today, one finds businesses more and more often pursuing tradition-
ally charitable models.258 Indeed, the current economic crisis has
produced proposals to combine for-profit businesses with charities to
transform the former into the latter. Perhaps the most serious argu-
ments in this vein are those suggesting that struggling news outlets
might be sustainable if restructured as charities. 259 Although no wide-
253 See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text; see also Colombo, supra note
110, at 505 ("[T] he predominant doctrinal approach that appears to be used in prac-
tice by both the Service and many courts is first to determine whether an activity is
conducted in a commercial manner and if so, to determine whether that activity is a
substantial purpose of the exempt organization, in which case, exemption is
denied.").
254 See Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission, supra note 73, at 9; Weisbrod, Pitfalls, supra
note 73, at 43.
255 See Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission, supra note 73, at 12-13.
256 See Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, Differential Taxation of Nonprofits
and the Commercialization of Nonprofit Revenues, in To PRoFrT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra
note 73, at 83, 103-04; Dennis R. Young, Alternative Perspectives on Social Enterprise, in
NONPROFITS & BUSINESS, supra note 76, at 21, 42-44.
257 See Colombo, supra note 110, at 514, 523-24.
258 See Cordes & Steurle, Changing Economy, supra note 250, at 54-64; Cordes &
Steurle, Body and Soul, supra note 250, at 9-18 (suggesting this trend may be
explained largely by the migration of the U.S. economy toward service provision and
the use of information and highly specialized personal skills).
259 See Tim Arango, Mother Jones Tests Nonprofit Model in Race to Survive the Recession,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at C1 (reporting that Mother Jones, a longtime nonprofit
magazine, received numerous inquiries as interest in nonprofit or endowed journal-
ism began to grow); Charles Lewis & Bruce Sievers, All the News That's Fit to Finance,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 12, 2009, at 72 (detailing proposals advocating founda-
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spread trend can yet be seen toward converting particular businesses
or industries into charities, some real life examples have arisen. For
example, when the for-profit Seattle Post-Intelligencer newspaper went
out of business in early 2009, its owners launched a skeleton online
successor to the paper.260 This successor employed very few former
staff members and offered limited coverage.261 Other staffers soon
began a competing venture, Seattle PostGlobe.org, a charity formed as
a nonprofit corporation.262 This venture teamed with a local tax-
exempt public television station as a fiscal sponsor and sought financ-
ing through a combination of advertising and donations.
263
For-profits pursuing social enterprise also fundamentally chal-
lenge the idea that commercial and charitable activities must be kept
separate. These entities manufacture products and offer services with
dual goals of making profits for their owners and making the world a
better place.264 Perhaps they use socially conscious sourcing in order
to procure needed inputs from poor suppliers or in ways that foster
local and indigenous production. 265 They may employ individuals
with limited employment prospects due to disability, socioeconomic
situation, or particular life experiences. 266 They may select their offer-
ings based not only on consumer demand but on views of what prod-
ucts or services should be placed into the economy and the stream of
commerce, with concerns about labor practices, environmental
impact, or public health.267 These developments sharply question
tion and other donative funding for struggling newspapers). See generally JAMES T.
HAMILTON, THE ROAD AHEAD FOR MEDIA HYBRIDS: REPORT OF THE DuKE NONPROFIT
MEDIA CONFERENCE (2009), available at http://dewitt.sanford.duke.edu/images/
uploads/About3-Research A3 Report.pdf (analyzing the barriers to nonprofit
foundations' ownership of media outlets); Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Can Nonprofits
Save Journalism? Legal Constraints and Opportunities (Joan Shorenstein Ctr. on the Press,
Politics and Pub. Policy Paper, 2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/press-
pol/publications/papers/can-nonprofits-save_journalism fremont-smith.pdf (dis-
cussing nonprofit journalism).
260 SeeJohnny Diaz, Online Upstarts Deliver News Without the Paper, Bos. GLOBE, May
14, 2009, at 5 (detailing the Seattle venture and several other similar ones); Former P-I
Staffers Launch Online Newspaper, DEALBOOK (Apr. 15, 2009), http://dealbook.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/04/15/former-p-i-staffers-launch-online-newspaper [hereinafter
Former P-I Staffers Launch].
261 See Former P-I Staffers Launch, supra note 260.
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 See Kelley, supra note 169, at 346.
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charity law's devotion to the idea that charity and commerce should
be truly distinct.
Another important challenge can be seen in the move by individ-
uals and firms to harness the profit-making potential of the poor as
consumers. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this is found in
the microfinance movement, most prominently associated with
Mohammed Yunus and Grameen Bank.268 The Grameen model,
begun in Bangladesh, is to offer very small loans to very poor borrow-
ers. These loans come with relatively high rates of interest, but make
financing available to borrowers who otherwise have no access to capi-
tal. 269 The loans are used to fund micro-scale business enterprises,
and borrowers are linked into a social network to foster norms regard-
ing repayment. 270 Grameen has shown profits using this model, and
the model has been replicated in other under-banked communi-
ties.271 Lending money in order to make a profit on interest pay-
ments is certainly a commercial activity and a Grameen-type entity
would not qualify as a charity under U.S. charity law for this and other
reasons. Yet, Grameen does not view itself as merely another profit-
making enterprise but rather one marrying commercial activity and
the desire to achieve social good.
2 7 2
This has been suggested as a more generalized model by Bill
Gates in his quest for "creative capitalism." 273 He and others have sug-
gested that if companies see the world's poor as an untapped source
of consumers (and perhaps suppliers and employees), capitalism can
268 See About Us, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?Item
id=164&task=blogsection&option=comcontent&id=5 (last visited Jan. 28, 2011); see
also MUHtAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR 115-50 (1998) (describing his creation
of Grameen Bank and its growth over the years).
269 See Philip Nichols, Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 229,
299-300 (1999).
270 See Grameen Bank at a Glance, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/
index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last visited Jan. 28,
2011).
271 See id.
272 See Is Grameen Bank Different from Conventional Banks?, GRAMEEN BANK, http://
www.grameeninfo.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=27&
Itemid=176 (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) (describing Grameen Bank as a "composite
objective, coming out of social and economic visions").
273 See Bill Gates, Chairman, Microsoft Corp., Remarks at the World Economic
Forum 2008: A New Approach to Capitalism in the 21st Century (Jan. 24, 2008) (tran-
script available at http://www.microsoft.com/Presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2008/
01-24WEFDavos.mspx); see also CREATIVE CAPrrALIsM (Michael Kinsley ed., 2008) (col-
lecting essays on the creative capitalism idea); Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism
Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REv.
831 (2008) (offering a model for evaluating CSR).
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be used to bring them not only goods and services they need but also
an improved quality of life. 27 4 He argues that the motive to produce
and expand both profits and recognition can propel companies to
serve the needs of the world's poor.2 75 He calls on business leaders to
take up this challenge in order to benefit the world-and their share-
holders or owners.
The pressure on charity law's anticommerciality rules is real,
building, and coming from all sides. Charity law should yield to this
pressure by explicitly removing federal tax exemption limitations on
charities' commercial activity and any state property tax law that bars
property tax exemption for charities engaging in commercial activity.
UBIT and state property tax rules that levy tax on charities' property
used for commercial purposes should be maintained, in order to pre-
serve the public fisc as needed. To the extent, however, that enforc-
ing these regimes injects government into the internal decisions
charities make about how best to achieve their missions, an attitude of
general skepticism is warranted.
Of course, charities' tax-favored status makes this form attractive
to individuals who wish not to engage in charity, but simply to avoid
taxes. This raises two serious fears276 about my proposals, to which I
propose two different solutions. The first concern is that some enti-
ties that are deemed by the law to be charities instead will be "for-
profits in disguise," used as vehicles to transfer tax-free payments to
insiders and others. Indeed, if a supposed charity abandons charita-
ble programming and expenditures, and merely runs a commercial
274 See Gates, supra note 273; see also MATrHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILAN-
THROCAPITALISM (2008) (arguing that capitalism can be harnessed to pursue social
good).
275 See Gates, supra note 273.
276 Another frequently raised concern is that charities engaging in commercial
activities will create inappropriate and unfair competition with small and other busi-
nesses. Yet, as a revenue generation opportunity, it is difficult to see why charities
aiming to produce as much revenue as possible to dedicate to their charitable mission
would price the products or services they offer at lower rates than the market would
bear. See Brody, supra note 76, at 99-100; Colombo, supra note 110, at 529-31. While
unfair competition concerns may be politically attractive arguments for anticom-
merciality rules in general, and UBIT in particular, the economic evidence does not
tend to support them. See Colombo, supra note 110, at 530-31; Michael S. Knoll, The
UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 FoRDHAM L. REv. 857,
891 (2007) ("Under ordinary circumstances, the exemption from tax does not pro-
vide nonprofits with the ability to outbid their for-profit competitors for business
assets."); Stone, supra note 109, at 1478. Professor Colombo also considers several
other possible rationales for federal tax law's anticommerciality position, but con-
cludes that none of these possibilities provide a robust defense of the current regime.
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business in order to cover its costs-including employee salaries-
there is real cause for concern.
Current charity law tries to separate true from disguised charities
by examining the scope and manner in which a charity operates its
commercial activities. 2 77 This real concern can instead be addressed
by stepped-up enforcement of charity law expressing the other-regard-
ing orientation requirement. If salaries are excessive or other private
payments are being made, this is prohibited inurement, excess bene-
fit, or private benefit and likely a breach of fiduciary obligation. If
profits are being sought simply to support these kinds of expendi-
tures, the charity breaches the nondistribution constraint and other
law and rules designed to implement the other-regarding orientation
requirement. On the other hand, however, if commercial activities
are undertaken to support a meaningful charitable program, this is a
beneficial activity and should not be limited.
Undertaking commercial activities is a tactical decision about how
to raise revenue, and sources of revenue for charities are limited and
inadequate. A charity itself is best able to make the decision whether
commercial activity will provide sufficient income to warrant taking on
its attendant financial and opportunity costs and risks of distraction.
It should make this decision through dialogue among its leaders and
other constituencies involved in group governance. When a charity
opts to engage in commercial activity, its need to earn a profit to sup-
port its mission-related programs will provide the necessary discipline
for its decision. Charities' autonomy is what allows them to play their
crucial role in civil society and to fill gaps in the market economy; it
should be zealously guarded.
278
A second serious concern about relaxing charity law's anticom-
merciality rules questions whether doing so will seriously damage the
public fisc. 27 9 Times are tough and public budgets are always
stretched thin. If for-profits in disguise move en masse from the taxa-
ble rolls to the exempt charity category, federal income tax revenues
will decrease. Localities already perceive charitable exemptions to
cause shortfalls serious enough that many have challenged them in
court or negotiated payments-in-lieu-of-taxes with individual well-
heeled charities. 28 0 My proposal takes the measured form it does
277 See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
278 But see Mayer, supra note 1, at 57-60 (arguing that the consumer influence
may challenge the autonomy of a charity engaged in commercial activity).
279 See Stone, supra note 109, at 1491.
280 See Brody, supra note 43, at 658-65; Gallagher, supra note 7, at 14-16.
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partly in order to deal with this concern, avoiding significant revenue
implications and making it politically feasible.
Remember, this proposal would strike only the commerciality
limitations blocking access to recognition and eligibility for tax-
exemption under federal and state law. Charities would be freed from
concerns that their revenue-generation decisions could cost them
their charity status if they breached a notoriously vague limitation on
"too much" or "too commercial" commercial activity. Yet, my propo-
sal would leave other current anticommerciality regimes firmly in
place. It would not repeal UBIT.28s It also would allow continuation
of the longstanding practice of considering state property tax exemp-
tion on a per-parcel basis, based on a combination of exempt organi-
zation ownership and charitable use. Although charities would not be
screened out of eligibility for tax exemption based on commercial
activities, income streams from businesses or parcels devoted to non-
charitable commercial uses could still be taxed. In each case, the pro-
posal allows taxation of assets (either income or owned property)
devoted to unrelated commercial activities,282 but does not threaten
the entity's eligibility for charity status due to its decision to undertake
them.
Taxation will, of course, still influence a charity's decision
whether to engage in unrelated commercial activities in order to earn
revenue or to pursue funding by some other means, such as related
commercial activities, donations, or grants. A rational charity will pur-
sue unrelated commercial endeavors if and when the anticipated post-
281 In fact, I have sympathy with calls to repeal UBIT. It can be criticized as
unhelpfully influencing charities' internal decisionmaking along the lines described
above. It is a very low revenue producing tax, the enforcement costs of which may
well not be warranted. However, proposing the repeal of any revenue producing tax
at this moment, if not anytime, makes the proponent too easy to disregard. See
Colombo, supra note 110, at 547-56.
282 Notably, in the case of UBIT, defining the unrelated category is not solely
about distinguishing truly charitable activities that produce income from more busi-
ness-like activities. I believe the proposal would be improved, therefore, by incorpo-
rating the simplifying changes to UBIT proposed by Professor Colombo. These
would remove the passive income and other exceptions in favor of applying the UBIT
to all commercial activities of exempt organizations. Colombo's proposal that UBIT
be expanded to apply to all commercial activities seems, at first glance, to remove the
relatedness criterion and therefore remove this level of government influence over
charity decisionmaking as well. However, this proposal really just moves the related-
ness question to differentiating "taxable commercial activities and nontaxable but rev-
enue-producing 'charitable' activities." Colombo, supra note 110, at 559. These
would still need to be distinguished to avoid taxing universities' tuition payments, for
example. I would, therefore, happily adopt this sense of unrelated rather than the
current UBIT regime's definition.
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tax revenue from them exceeds that from other potential revenue
sources. Placing unrelated commercial activities on this footing as
compared with other revenue-generating opportunities appropriately
re-centers charity law on its roots in enforcing the mission imperative.
Charity law should focus charities and their leaders on the need to
serve mission, not micromanage their decisions about how to produce
the revenue needed to do so.
D. Political Charity
The greatest challenge to charity law's exhortation that charities
avoid politics comes from the actions charities themselves have taken
to avoid these restrictions. Boldest among these actions have been
direct legal assaults on federal restrictions on political activity,
grounded on First Amendment and autonomy arguments. 28 3 On the
federal level, where one finds most of the law requiring that charities
eschew politics, these challenges have been uniformly unsuccessful.
284
283 Charities have challenged the federal law restrictions on their political activi-
ties virtually since their inception on both constitutional and public policy grounds.
The ultimate word on the constitutional question came from the U.S. Supreme Court
in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983).
Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR) was an organization that applied
for exempt status under § 501 (c) (3) to promote the "public interest" on taxation
issues by publishing a journal, litigating cases, and lobbying. See id. at 543. Prior to
the suit, TWR had used a dual structure, locating its publishing and litigation activities
in a § 501(c) (3) entity and its lobbying in a separate affiliate organized under
§ 501(c) (4). See id. TWR consolidated all of these functions into a single organiza-
tion and applied for (c) (3) exempt status, precipitating the case. See id. The IRS
denied exemption to it on grounds that the organization failed the requirement that
no substantial part of its net earnings be used for lobbying. See id. at 542. Among
other things, TWR argued that the lobbying restriction placed an unconstitutional
condition on its free speech as protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 545. The
Court upheld the statute, with the plurality relying on the identification of the federal
tax benefits for charities as a subsidy. The Court explained that although Congress
cannot deny a benefit to a person on the basis of his exercise of a constitutional right,
Congress need not subsidize protected activity. See id. at 545-46. Refusing to subsi-
dize charities' political activity thus simply did not count as an infringement or restric-
tion on First Amendment free speech. See id. at 549.
Justice Blackmun's concurrence provided the important fifth vote. He wrote sep-
arately to point out that he agreed with the majority if and on the assumption that the
dual (c)(3)/(c)(4) structure remains available. See id. at 552-53. This structure
ensures that exempt organizations may engage in lobbying without losing their
exemption, but would prevent funding this activity with deductible contributions. See
id. at 553; see also supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.




Some state law challenges have prevailed, 2 5 but there are so few state-
level restrictions on political activity that this offers charities with polit-
ical aspirations little comfort.
In response, charities have taken more pragmatic steps to pursue
the political activities they see as fundamental to pursuing their mis-
sions. Current charity law allows charities to engage in insubstantial
political activity, and some charities do so. By electing special 501 (h)
status, more lobbying may permitted, though it must be carefully
tracked and reported. The dual and triad affiliated structures
described above sanction significant interrelation and coordination
between charitable and political entities, and even permit charities to
provide some support for candidates. 28 6 By blessing these structures,
federal law has already allowed the idea that charities must eschew
politics to be seriously undermined.
Of course, use of the § 501 (h) and affiliated structure strategies
will only be available to charities of a certain size and sophistication.
They impose serious administrative burdens. Too, perhaps, they
impose reputational costs, as charity law expresses the idea that chari-
table and political endeavor are incompatible. Together, these costs
of affiliation will be insurmountable for many small, novel, or unor-
thodox charities. Yet, many charities clearly see political advocacy and
even campaign activity as an important way to pursue their missions.
Otherwise, they would not shoulder the cost (which cannot be funded
through deductible contributions) to structure themselves in dual or
triad forms and would not undergo the administrative pains required
to maintain those structures or § 501 (h) status.
Corporate foundations provide another example of how charities
use affiliation to stretch the limits placed on them by federal tax law's
restrictions on political activity. Due to their single funding source,
corporate foundations almost always will be characterized as private
foundations, 28 7 which operate under separate and especially restric-
285 See, e.g., New England Legal Found. v. City of Bos., 670 N.E.2d 152, 158 n.8
(Mass. 1996) (holding that an organization that engaged primarily in test-case litiga-
tion was charitable and not political, permitting it to retain property-tax exemption);
Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Twp. of Lansing, 378 N.W.2d 737, 743 n.6 (Mich.
1985) (finding the organization's lobbying activities would not bar its property tax
exemption).
286 See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
287 See I.R.C. § 509 (2006) (defining as private foundations any § 501(c) (3)
exempt entity not qualifying as a traditional charity, such as a church, school or hospi-
tal, or receiving more than one-third of its support from the public, or as an organiza-
tion supporting an entity fitting one of the prior two categories); see also IRS,
PUBLICATION 557: TAx-ExEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION 27-43 (2008)
(explaining the application of the tests for private foundation status in detail).
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tive limits on political activity. The Internal Revenue Code lists
amounts paid by private foundations for lobbying legislators or gov-
ernment officials directly, for expenditures to persuade members of
the public to do the same, to influence elections, and even to carry on
voter registration drives as taxable expenditures, and subjects them to
penalty taxes. 288 Corporate foundations, however, have a relatively
easy way to avoid these significant restrictions. A sympathetic donor
for-profit corporation may simply add the foundation's political
agenda to its own government relations strategy.289
Here, as elsewhere, innovators also have used for-profit forms in
order to sidestep charity law's restrictions. For example, the founders
of Google.org explained their use of a for-profit model partly as a way
to avoid restrictions charity law would place on political activities.
Early explanations of its choice of form highlighted plans "to lobby
for policies that support [its] philanthropic goals" as part of its ratio-
nale for choosing the for-profit philanthropy model.2 90 Google.org
has not yet indicated any plans to participate in political campaigns,
though its structure as a division of for-profit Google Inc. would give it
ample flexibility to do so.
When compared with charities, the political activities of business
entities are relatively unrestricted. Of course, campaign finance rules
requiring contribution disclosures and registration of lobbyists can
apply to business actors, as they do to all speakers. 29 1 The recent deci-
sion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission29 2 removed some
288 See I.R.C. § 4945.
289 1 thank Professor Garry Jenkins for this insight.
290 Our Structure, GOOGLE.ORG (formerly available at http://www.google.org/
about.html) (on file with author); see also Strom & Helft, supra note 163 (noting Larry
Brilliant's belief that Google.org's ability to lobby was one of its advantages). Another
option is to incorporate offshore. See, e.g., Ian Wilhelm, Atlantic Philanthropies Stakes
$25 Million on Health-Care Lobbying Group, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 20, 2009, at 10
(describing avoiding political limitations as one reason for Atlantic Philanthropies'
incorporation in Bermuda).
291 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2006) (requiring disclosures of contributions to fund
certain campaign advertisements); id. § 1603 (mandating lobbyist registration).
292 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Various scholars have now opined on the likely impact
of Citizens United on political limitations imposed on federally tax-exempt charities.
See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organiza-
tions After Citizens United (Loyola Law Sch. L.A., Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-57,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727565; Roger Colinvaux, Citizens United
and the Political Speech of Charities (December 17, 2010) (unpublished working
paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726407; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobby-
ing. Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United (Note Dame Law Sch., Legal




previously existing limits on for-profit corporate speech, further
widening the charity-business divide on this issue.
Court battles and affiliated structures of various kinds have long
raised questions about the force and desirability of a strong division
between charity and politics. Innovations blending charity and busi-
ness models have added new pathways for charities who wish to opt
out of the political restrictions. These efforts combine to create sub-
stantial pressure challenging the legal restrictions on charities' politi-
cal activities. Again, charity law should relent.
Like in the anticommerciality context, the key issues are mission
and autonomy. The United States and the world more broadly are
political places. In order to achieve societal good and certainly to
make any sort of meaningful change, some political action is often
necessary. It does little good for charity law to define engagement
with the political system as outside the proper charitable sphere.
Doing so can force charities to be fundamentally less relevant to the
civil society they are supposed to embody and less able to achieve the
missions they are charged with pursuing.293 Doing so also encourages
charities to create administratively complex organizations in order to
engage in the political activities they see as crucial, to skirt the rules,
or to opt out of charity status.
As much as possible, charity law's restrictions on political activity
should be removed. Primarily, these will be federal tax law restric-
tions. To the extent that state organizational law and property tax law
also condition charity status on refraining from political activity, these
constraints should also be eliminated. Charities themselves are best
situated to determine when political action will be useful in pursuing
their missions. When political involvement is used as a mere subter-
fuge for pursuit of private purposes, the inurement, excess benefit,
and private benefit doctrines, fiduciary obligation, and the nondis-
tribution and charitable purpose requirements provide sufficient
enforcement muscle for regulators. So long as charities remain com-
mitted to an other-regarding purpose and are structured to police this
293 See Alyssa Battistoni, An Ounce of Advocacy, STAN. Soc. INNOV. REv., Winter
2010, at 37 (arguing nonprofit advocacy is the best use of resources aimed to prevent
and relieve disasters); Chisolm, supra note 137, at 241-44 (noting the arguments that
the political restrictions steer nonprofits away from their view of their mission); see
also LESLIE R. CRUTCHFIELD & HEATHER MCLEOD GRANT, FORCES FOR GOOD (2008)
(arguing that combining service provision and political advocacy is the first of six
practices identified with nonprofits that achieve especially great social impact); cf
Mayer, supra note 1, at 34 (arguing for a removal or relaxation of the lobbying restric-
tions on autonomy grounds, but favoring retention of the electioneering restrictions
to avoid abuses of and by charities).
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purpose through a strong group model, any other limits on charities'
engagement with the political system should be imposed by the lobby-
ing and election law limits seen fit to apply to other actors within it.
Of course, some will worry that the tax-deductible status of chari-
table contributions will lead to abuses beyond the reach of lobbying
and election law. The federal tax prohibition on electioneering has
been argued to dovetail importantly with broader election regulation,
operating together to avoid such abuses.29 4 This suggests an impor-
tant caveat to my proposals here. Charity law does not exist in a vac-
uum, but as part of the web of law regulating charities and other
institutions engaged in charitable and noncharitable activities.
Changes in charity law may, therefore, necessitate changes in other
areas. If charity law's restrictions on political activity are relaxed in
recognition of the fact that political activity in general, and participa-
tion in electoral campaigns in particular, can be an appropriate part
of a charity's programs, other areas of law might need to change in
response. But, regulating the potential for influence-peddling, brib-
ery, or political distortions in these activities is a more appropriate
task for lobbying or campaign finance laws than it is for charity law.
If removing charity law's political restrictions entirely is not politi-
cally feasible, 295 alternative reforms should focus on restricting use of
deductible contributions or exempt property rather than barring
access to charity status. The current federal system opening political
activity only to those organizations that can afford to structure them-
selves using complex dual or triad forms is not a sufficient solution. It
disturbingly solves the problem of lack of political access only for
those charities affluent and sophisticated enough to use these
techniques.
CONCLUSION
Charity law can best promote mission accountability by focusing
on two essential requirements: charities must maintain an other-
294 See Tobin, supra note 137, at 1339-42 (arguing that it would be extremely diffi-
cult to track deductible contributions if charities were permitted to engage in
electioneering).
295 Intriguingly, there has been some recent political support for repeal or limita-
tion of federal tax law's political restrictions on charities. A now-public staff memo to
Senator Charles Grassley, Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, advocates removing or limiting the federal prohibitions on campaign activity by
§ 501(c) (3) exempt public charities "because the game is not worth the candle."
Memorandum from Theresa Pattara & Sean Barnett to Senator Grassley, Re: Review




regarding orientation and must be governed by a group. The require-
ment that charities be other-regarding, not self-regarding, stems the
possibility that charitable mission will be clouded by self-interest. The
requirement that a charity must be controlled by a strong and diverse
group, rather than by the vision of a single individual, provides a struc-
ture for articulating, evaluating and evolving mission internally over
time.
Current charity law strongly asserts the other-regarding orienta-
tion requirement. However, rather than embracing the group govern-
ance norm, much of current charity law is taken up identifying,
restricting, and penalizing charities' commercial and political activity.
When focused on an other-regarding purpose and governed by a
diverse group, charities themselves are better suited to determine
when these categories of activity threaten mission, and when they are
pivotal to carrying mission forward. Thus, charity law should be
reformed to refocus on the other-regarding orientation and group
governance requirements, excising restrictions on commercial and
political activity where possible. Doing so will not only improve char-
ity law's ability to regulate traditional charities, but will also give it the
necessary tools to respond to the spate of recent innovations blurring
the boundary between charity and business.
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